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First,do no harm.' He who seeks to
regulate everything by law is more likely to
arouse vices than to reform them.2 It is

one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. 3 It is clear after all these many
years that ourfederal government does not
have the right answers. It is time for other,
more local governments to retake
command.4

I. Introduction
On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court granted
review in Gonzales v. Raich,5 one of the California
medical marijuana cases. 6 Oral argument was heard

*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville. J.D. Ph.D. Thanks to John Scheb for
his valuable feedback on this project.
1 Hippocrates, c. 420 B.C.
2 Benedict de Spinoza, Freedom of Thought and Speech,
reprintedin CHIEF WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, at 261

(R.H.M. Elwes, trans. 1936).
3 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4 JAMES GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND
WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF
THE WAR ON DRUGS 15 (2001).
5 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Nov. 29, 2004, Ashcroft v.
Raich, No. 03-1454 (hereinafter, OralArg.) Since Alberto
Gonzales replaced John Ashcroft as U.S. Attorney General on
February 3, 2005, the Supreme Court's ruling will be titled
Gonzales v. Raich.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.,
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on November 29, 2004, and a ruling is expected by
June, 2005. 7 Raich presents the Court an historic
opportunity to enable sensible drug law reform at
the State level. 8
A.

Legal Context

Raich arises at the nexus of three sources of
9
law. It began as a conflict, brewing for some time,
between state and federal legislation. The state law
is Proposition 215. It was enacted by a California
ballot initiative in 1996 and codified as the

532 U.S. 483 (2001); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th
Cir. 2002); Women's Alliance for Med. Marijuana v. United
States, No. 02-MC-7012 JF (N.D. Cal. 2002); County of Santa
Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
7 See Charles Lane, High Court Not Receptive to Marijuana
Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at A03, and David Savage,
Justices Take on Medical Pot Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2004, at Al.
8 It is fortunate that the Court has granted review at a
relatively early stage in the litigation. As we shall see, the case
came up in the remedial context, i.e., whether the District
Court properly denied appellants' request for a preliminary
injunction, pending trial, against enforcement of the CSA.
Had the Supreme Court waited until the District Court, on
remand, had granted the preliminary injunction and proceeded
to trial, followed by an appeal from a final judgment in that
case, any guidance the Court could provide on this urgent
issue might have been postponed for years. When we consider
that Judge Beam, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit opinion,
would have remanded to the District Court for hearings on
justiciability issues of standing and ripeness, see Raich v.
Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1237 ( 8th Circuit, 2003), the
unlikelihood of this opportunity seems even clearer.
9 As the Mayor of Santa Cruz observed two years ago,

"Clearly, state law and federal law are on a collision course."
Christopher Krohn, Why I'm FightingFederalDrug Laws
from City Hall, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2002, at A15.

3
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Compassionate Use Act (CUA).I 0 The appellants in
Raich possessed and used marijuana under the
CUA, which is intended to ensure that seriously ill
Californians have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes. Medical use is
deemed appropriate once a physician determines
that the person's health would benefit from the use
of marijuana in the treatment of the following
10 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5. For background on
Proposition 215, see ALAN BOCK, WAITING TO EXHALE: THE
POLITICS OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA (2000); ROBERT J.
MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES:
LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES, 378-380

(2001) (Rand Studies in Policy Analysis) (hereinafter,
"RAND"); and ED ROSENTHAL & STEVE KUBBY, WHY
MARIJUANA SHOULD BE ILLEGAL 94-101 (2003).
On federal and state responses to medical
marijuana generally, see RUDOLPH. J. GERBER,
LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND
PROHIBITION POLITICS chs. 1-3; 5-7 (2004); Lauryn

Gouldin, Cannabis,Compassionate Use and the
Commerce Clause: Why Developments in California
May Limit the ConstitutionalReach of the FederalDrug
Laws, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 471,475-82 (1999);
Alistair Newbern, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Federal
Prosecution ofState-LegalizedMedical Marijuana Use
After United States v. Lopez, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1575,

1586-89 (2000); Erik R. Neusch, MedicalMarijuana's
Fate in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court's New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,72 U. COLO. L. REV.
201 (2001); Dennis Newitt, The Medical Use of
Marijuana:State Legislation, JudicialInterpretation
and FederalDrug Laws, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC.
156, 158-68 (2002); Alex Kreit, The Future of Medical
Marijuana:Should the States Grow Their Own? 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1787, 1793-1800 (2003). Every state that
has voted on medical marijuana has legalized it. See
Ethan Nadelmann, Going to Pot: The Growing

Movement TowardEnding America 's Irrational
MarijuanaProhibition,NAT'L REVIEW, July 12, 2004, at
30.

4
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medical conditions: cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic
pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or
any other illness for which marijuana has shown to
provide relief.1
The federal law, enacted in 1970, is the
Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act,
popularly called the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA).
The CSA classifies marijuana as a
Schedule I controlled substance, which means that
in Congress' view, it has a high potential for abuse,
no officially accepted medicinal uses, and no safe
level of use under medical supervision. 13 Except for
rare controlled experiments, federal law flatly
prohibits the possession or use of even small
quantities of marijuana. 14
15
Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI,
federal law preempts contrary state law. 16 At the
same time, Congress can act only within its
constitutional powers. Among the most important
of these is the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ...
among the several States .

. .

"17 on which it

expressly relied when enacting the CSA. 18 For 60
years, such reliance would almost certainly have
ensured federal power to enact the law in
11Cal. Health& Safety Code § 11362.5(b)(1)(A).
12

21 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. (2002).

"

21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). On the rest of the CSA scheduling

system, see Gouldin, supra note 10, at 477-78, and Bock,
supra note 10, at 223-224.

In Oakland Cannabis,the Supreme Court ruled that there is
no medical necessity exception to enforcement of the CSA.
532 U.S. at 497-99.
15 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
16 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992);
Conant, 309 F.3d at 645-46 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18 See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227; 21 U.S.C.S. § 801 (2002).
14

5
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question. 19 Since 1995, however, the High Court
has established precedent2 0 striking down certain
federal laws as beyond the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause. Though federal law may
preempt contrary state law, it can do so only if the
federal law is within Congress' power in the first
place. E1 Constitutional law, specifically Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, is thus the third and
overarching source of law within which Raich must
be resolved.
In Part II, I argue that Judge Harry Pregerson's
Circuit
opinion in Raich is correct: appellants'
th
9
possession and use of marijuana under the authority
of the CUA is beyond Congress' commerce power,
and the CSA is unconstitutional as applied to
them. 2 Notwithstanding Judge Arlen Beam's
19 See Neusch, supra note 10, at 221-23; Newbem, supra note
10, at 1600-05; and Glenn Reynolds & Brandon Denning,
Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause
JurisprudenceEncounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV.
1253, 1257 (2003).
20 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Jones v. United
States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
21 As the court notes in Raich, in Oakland Cannabisthe
Supreme Court expressly reserved the question whether the
CSA exceeds Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.
352 F.3d at 1227.
22 The activity at issue in Raich is distinct from that for which
other possible regimes of state law might provide, like the
regulated cultivation and distribution of medical marijuana
under controlled circumstances. See, e.g., Kreit, supra note 10;
Newitt, supra note 10; Gouldin, supra note 10; J. GRAY, supra
note 4, at 222-29; DIRK CHASE ELDREDGE, ENDING THE WAR
ON DRUGS (1998); Eric Sterling, Principlesand Proposalsfor
Managing the DrugProblem, in HOW To LEGALIZE DRUGS,
523-24 (Jefferson Fish ed., 1998). Regarding attempted bills at
the state level, see Stanley Neustadter, Legalization
Legislation: Confronting the Detailsof Policy Choices, in

6
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spirited dissent and the Ninth Circuit's reputation
for frequent reversal,23 I shall argue that the Court
HOW TO LEGALIZE DRUGS (Jefferson Fish, ed., 1998). Though
many such regimes are defensible policy, they do not seem
promising insofar as distribution, particularly where money
changes hands, is commerce that could constitutionally be
regulated under the CSA. By contrast, appellants' activity in
Raich is the private, personal cultivation, possession and
(medical) use of marijuana.
The political branches of the federal government might
seem best suited to provide drug policy reform. See
ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at 165-66. The Bush
Administration's appeal in Raich indicates the low likelihood
of reform through the executive branch. As for Congress,
Neusch observed that "[tihe most logical solution to the
problem, rescheduling marijuana from a Schedule I to a
Schedule II category, is not politically viable." Neusch, supra
note 10, at 211. Indeed, shortly after Proposition 215 was
enacted, Congress passed a "sense of the Congress" resolution
in opposition to medical marijuana. Statement of National
Antidrug Policy, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 275761. As Uelman adds, "Ultimately, the final resolution of the
medical marijuana issue will not come until Congress is ready
to reclassify marijuana, removing it from Schedule I of the
Controlled Substances Act. That's not likely to happen in the
Congress elected on November 5, 2002." Gerald Uelman,
Marijuana:FederalAuthorities Can't DistinguishMedical
Use from RecreationalUse, But Voters Can, at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew83.php (Jan. 8,
2003). Most recently, Congress even rejected a bill directing
the DEA not to enforce the CSA contrary to state laws
allowing medical marijuana. See Viewpoint, ROLL CALL, July
13, 2004; For the Record, WASH. POST, Jul. 11, 2004, at T11.
Neustadter opines that that the states can do nothing in this
area until federal policy changes. See Neustadter, supra note
22, at 389-90. Raich, however, provides an opening for reform
even assuming Congress' continued intransigence.
23 The Ninth Circuit has a reputation for being
overruled, even
unanimously, more often than any other federal appellate
court. See Adam Liptak, Court That Ruled on Pledge Often
Runs Afoul of Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30, 2002, at 1.

7
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should affirm Judge Pregerson's opinion on the

merits.
While the Ninth Circuit should be affirmed, we
shall see in Part III that there is a fundamental
oversight in the opinion that Acting Solicitor
General Paul Clement predictably mentioned both
in his brief and at oral argument. Pregerson
repeatedly suggests that a key reason for his ruling
is that appellants' use of marijuana is for medicinal
purposes. While we shall see that this emphasis on
the medicinal character of appellants' use is
understandable, Mr. Clement suggested that this
purpose is irrelevant to the constitutional issue at
stake: 24 if the private possession and use of
marijuana by adults is beyond Congress' commerce
power, then that is so whether or not the
consumption is for medicinal purposes, for the
activity that Congress seeks to regulate is identical
either way. Accordingly, the argument would run, a
vote to affirm Pregerson is a vote for a slippery
slope into a nightmare scenario in which states will
be free to legalize the use of any Schedule One drug
for recreational purposes.
Activities involving commerce are usually
reachable by Congress, and Mr. Clement
understood that no state would enact most of the
noncommercial regimes he might have predicted.
Had he had the time to develop his argument,
however, he could plausibly have insisted that some
states might seriously consider enacting what I shall
call the Personal Cultivation Initiative (PCI). The
PCI would allow any adult to cultivate and possess
a limited number of marijuana plants within his
24

See Brief for Petitioners, Ashcroft v. Raich, No. 03-1354

(Aug. 2004) at 40, and OralArg., at 15.

8
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domicile strictly for personal consumption, not sale
or trade, solely by adults within that domicile.
Commerce Clause merits aside, then, the
refined policy question in Raich is whether a State
could rationally enact the PCI. I shall answer this
question in the affirmative, arguing that even if the
Justices are concerned about the policy implications
of upholding Judge Pregerson, on reflection they
could conclude that a State could rationally enact
the PCI.25
On this basis, I conclude that the Court should
affirm Judge Pregerson with a broad ruling clearly
acknowledging, or at least not denying, that State
level reformers would not be wasting resources
working to enact the PCI. As an empirical matter,
however, any majority that could be formed to
uphold Judge Pregerson would likely do so only on
narrow grounds. Assuming this is correct, and that
the medicinal/recreational distinction is irrelevant to
the Commerce Clause question, I conclude by
offering 1) an alternative basis for a narrow ruling
upholding Judge Pregerson, and 2) some thoughts
on the implications of a reversal of Judge
Pregerson.
II. The Ninth Circuit Ruling
A. Factualand ProceduralBackground
Judge Pregerson succinctly presented the facts
and procedure in Raich:

25

As this discussion suggests, Raich involves an interesting

confluence of liberal social policy and conservative
constitutional interpretation. I shall return to this point.

9
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Appellants Angel McClary Raich and
Diane Monson (the "patient-appellants")
are California citizens who currently use
marijuana as a medical treatment.
Appellant Raich has been diagnosed with
more than ten serious medical conditions,
including an inoperable brain tumor, lifethreatening weight loss, a seizure
disorder, nausea, and several chronic pain
disorders. Appellant Monson suffers from
severe chronic back pain and constant,
painful muscle spasms. Her doctor states
that these symptoms are caused by a
degenerative disease of the spine.
Raich has been using marijuana as a
medication for over five years, every two
waking hours of every day. Her doctor
contends that Raich has tried essentially
all other legal alternatives and all are
either ineffective or result in intolerable
side effects; her doctor has provided a list
of thirty-five medications that fall into the
latter category alone. Raich's doctor states
that foregoing marijuana treatment may
be fatal. Monson has been using
marijuana as a medication since 1999.
Monson's doctor also contends that
alternative medications have been tried
and are either ineffective or produce
intolerable side effects. As the district
court put it: "Traditional medicine has
utterly failed these women.... "
Appellant Monson cultivates her own
marijuana. Raich is unable to cultivate
her own. Instead, her two caregivers,
appellants John Doe Number One and

10
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John Doe Number Two, grow it for her.
These caregivers provide Raich with her
marijuana free of charge. They have sued
anonymously in order to protect Raich's
supply of medical marijuana. In growing
marijuana for Raich, they allegedly use
only soil, water, nutrients, growing
equipment,
supplies
and
lumber
originating from or manufactured within
California. Although these caregivers
cultivate marijuana for Raich, she
processes some of the marijuana into
cannabis oils, balm, and foods.
On August 15, 2002, deputies from the
Butte County Sheriffs Department and
agents from the Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") came to Monson's
home. The sheriffs deputies concluded
that Monson's use of marijuana was legal
under the Compassionate Use Act.
However, after a three-hour standoff
involving the Butte County District
Attorney and the United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of California, the
DEA agents seized and destroyed
26
Monson's six cannabis plants.
Fearing raids in the future and the
prospect of being deprived of medicinal
marijuana, the appellants sued the United
States Attorney General John Ashcroft
and the Administrator of the DEA Asa
As Schlosser notes, Ashcroft had "vowed to 'escalate the
war on drugs."' ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX,
26

DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK

MARKET 67 (2004).

11
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Hutchison on October 9, 2002. Their suit
seeks declaratory relief and preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief. They
seek a declaration that the CSA is
unconstitutional to the extent it purports
to prevent them from possessing,
obtaining, manufacturing, or providing
cannabis for medical use. The appellants
also seek a declaration that the doctrine of
medical necessity precludes enforcement
of the CSA to prevent Raich and Monson
or
obtaining,
possessing,
from
manufacturing cannabis for their personal
medical use.

27

On March 5, 2003, the district court
denied the appellants' motion for a
preliminary injunction. The district court
found that "despite the gravity of
plaintiffs' need for medical cannabis, and
despite the concrete interest of California
to provide it for individuals like them,"
the appellants had not established the
required "'irreducible minimum' of a
likelihood of success on the merits under
the law of this Circuit ...,28

B. The Commerce Clause Merits
As this background indicates, though Raich
centers on the substantive domain of the Commerce
27

Since the Ninth Circuit ruled for appellants on the

Commerce Clause issue, it did not address their other
arguments, including the medical necessity claim. See Raich,
352 F.3d at 1227.
28 Id. at 1225-26.

12
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Clause, the case came to the Ninth Circuit in the
remedial context of a request for a preliminary
injunction. The questions are fused, however, since
the substantive question must be addressed in order
to resolve the remedial issue. As Judge Pregerson
explains, "[T]he traditional test for granting
preliminary injunctive relief requires the applicant
to demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) a significant threat of irreparable injury;
(3) that the balance of hardships favors the
applicant; and (4) whether any public interest favors
granting the injunction. ' '2 9 Pregerson gives the
merits prong of this test, which embodies the
Commerce Clause analysis, the lengthiest treatment.
In this analysis, three cases are central: Wickard v.
Filburn,3 ° United States v. Lopez, 3 1 and United
States v. Morrison.32
1. Wickard, Lopez, and Morrison
Wickard involved amendments to the 1938
Agricultural Adjustment Act. In order to stimulate
trade, Congress sought to stabilize the national price
of wheat by regulating the volume of wheat in
interstate commerce. The Act thus provided for a
national acreage allotment of wheat, which was
subdivided into quotas for individual farmers.
Roscoe Filburn owned a small farm in Ohio, and
was allotted 11.1 acres for his 1941 wheat crop. He
29 Id. at 1227. (emphasis added). While Pregerson mentions an

alternative test, he notes the two "are not inconsistent," and,
indeed, "likelihood of success on the merits" is a key factor in
both. Id.
" 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
31514 U.S. 549 (1995).
32

529 U.S. 598 (2000).

13
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grew 23 acres of wheat, intending to keep the
excess crop for his own consumption. Filburn was
fined under the Act, but he refused to pay the fine
and filed suit, challenging the law's application to
him under the Commerce Clause.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Robert
Jackson upheld the law as applied to Mr. Filburn.
Rejecting the formalist distinctions of earlier
cases, 33 Jackson wrote:
[I]t is well established by decisions of this
Court that the power to regulate
commerce includes the power to regulate
the prices at which commodities in that
It can hardly
commerce are dealt in ....
be denied that a factor of such volume
and variability as home-consumed wheat
would have a substantial 34influence on
price and market conditions.
How could a single wheat farmer have had
Wickard established the
such an influence?
own
"[A]ppellee's
aggregation principle:
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial
by itself, [but it] is not enough to remove him from
the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial. ' 3 5
Moreover, even "if we assume that [the wheat] is
13 See

Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123-25.
id. at 128.
" Id. at 127-28. As Newbern notes, "Wickard stands for the
proposition that no matter how personalized or local an
economic actor's conduct might be, if her conduct, multiplied,
would affect interstate commerce, it may fall under Congress'
regulatory control." Newbem, supra note 10, at 1601.
34

14
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never marketed, it supplies the needs of the man
who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by
purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat
in this sense competes with wheat in commerce
.... 9,36 Establishing "perhaps the most far-reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity," 37 Jackson held that "even if
appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce
,,38

Issued more than 50 years after Wickard,
Lopez was a landmark ruling. 39 Section 922(q) of
U.S. at 128.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
38 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
39 It has been described as the opening shot in a Commerce
Clause revolution. See Newbern, supra note 10, at 1632;
Reynolds & Denning, supra note 19 at 1257-62. Newbern
notes that "[w]ithin eight months of Lopez's decision, more
than eighty challenges to federal Commerce Clause based
criminal statutes were filed in district courts. Four years after
Lopez was handed down, that number had grown to 566 cases
filed in federal courts." Newbem, supra note 10, at 1607-08.
As Marcus Green thus observes, "[T]he Lopez decision is
central to the 'new federalism revival' (consisting of) three
interrelated lines of cases (those involving the Tenth
Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, and the Commerce
Clause)." Marcus Green, Guns, Drugs, and Federalism:
Rethinking Commerce-EnabledRegulation of Mere
Possession, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 2543, 2545-46 (2004). In
Calabresi's view, "perhaps the most striking feature of the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has been the revival over the
last 5-10 years of doctrines of constitutional federalism."
Steven Calabresi, Federalismand the Rehnquist Court: A
Normative Defense, 574 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & Sci. 24,
25 (2001). For a nuanced view in which "there is both less and
more to the federalism revolution than generally meets the
36 Wickard, 315
37

15
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the Gun-Free Zones Act (GFZA) created a federal
crime "for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone," i.e.,
on or within 1000 feet of a public or private
school. 40 Though Lopez was arrested and charged
under the state counterpart of the GFZA, those
charges were dropped when federal agents charged
him with a violation of § 922(q). 4 ' Upon conviction,
Lopez appealed, challenging § 922(q) as beyond
Congress' commerce power.
Writing for a five-four majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist upheld the Fifth Circuit's reversal of
Lopez's conviction. Though the Court did not
directly overrule Wickard, "it carefully limited the
Beginning with "first
,42
reach of Wickard ...
'
3
principles, A and embracing a dual, rather than
cooperative, model of federalism,44 Rehnquist
eye," see Richard Fallon, The "Conservative" Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
429, 493 (2002).
Linda Greenhouse recently opined that "the Rehnquist
Court's federalism revolution ... appeared this term to stall in
its tracks," but she relies primarily on an Eleventh
Amendment case, Tennessee v. Lane, 54 U.S. 509 (2004), for
this assertion. Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May

Have Lost His Court, N. Y. Times, Jul. 3, 2004 at Al. On the
Eleventh Amendment, see Newbern, supra note 10, at 161417.
40 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A).
41 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
42 United States v. McCoy, 823 F.3d 1114, 1120 ( th Cir.
9
2003).
43 Newbern, supra note 10, at 1618 ("foreshadow[ing] the tone
of the originalist argument to follow").
44 See CRAIG DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:

POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 271-76 (7th ed., 2000). In an
influential article, Irving Kristol argued that federalism is one
of four major pillars of our constitutional system, the others

16
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quoted Madison's proposition: "[T]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite., 45 Citing John Marshall,
he observed that "the federal government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. '46
Regarding the Commerce Clause,
Rehnquist wrote, "Gibbons .

.

. acknowledged that

limitations on the commerce power are inherent in
the very language of the Commerce Clause ....
enumeration
presupposes
something
not
enumerated. 47 In other words, if the power to
being democracy, republicanism, and capitalism. See Irving
Kristol, On the Characterof the American PoliticalOrder, in
TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL

POLITICAL ISSUES 4-10 (George McKenna & Stanley Feingold
eds.,

12 th

ed. 2001).

As an analogue, in spite of the powerful links between
education on the one hand and the success of liberal
republican democracy (via the exercise of fundamental rights
like free speech and voting) on the other, the Court properly
ruled in San Antonio Independent School Districtv.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), that education is not a
fundamental interest for Equal Protection purposes. Among
other reasons, principles of both federalism and separation of
powers render the federal courts the last branch and level of
government that should oversee the operation of public
education. See generally, MARTIN D. CARCIERI, DEMOCRACY

AND EDUCATION INCLASSICAL ATHENS AND THE AMERICAN

FOUNDING (2002).

45 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting The FEDERALIST No. 45

(James Madison), 292-93 (C. Rossiter, ed., 1961)).
46 Id. at 566 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
405
47 (1819)).
Id. at 553. In the words of Marshall, one of the staunchest
and most influential Federalists ever, "[I]t is not intended to
say that these words comprehend that commerce which is
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man
in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and
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regulate interstate commerce is to have any
coherent meaning, there must be activity that is not
interstate commerce, i.e., that is intrastate and/or
noncommercial.
The Court thus established firm limits on the
meaning of "commerce" for Commerce Clause
purposes. Drawing a line between commercial and
noncommercial activity,4 8 the Supreme Court wrote:
[S]ection 922(q) is a criminal statute that
by its terms has nothing to do with
"commerce" or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might
define those terms. Section 922(q) is not
an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated ....
The possession of a gun in a local school
zone is in no sense an economic activity.
49

In concurrence, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
added:
which does not extend to or affect other states." Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
48 As Justices Kennedy and O'Connor wrote, "we cannot
avoid the obligation to draw lines, often close and difficult
lines, in adjudicating constitutional rights." Lopez, 514 U.S. at

579.
49
Id. at 561, 567. Thus, though the Court upheld the federal
loansharking law (Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act) in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), money
changes hands by definition in such transactions. Because this
is commercial as well as criminal activity, Perez is
distinguishable from Raich.
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[H]ere neither the actors nor their conduct
have a commercial character and neither
the purposes nor the design of the statute
have an evident commercial nexus. The
statute makes the simple possession of a
gun within 1,000 feet of the grounds of
the school a criminal offense. ...

[A]nd it

does so by regulating an activity beyond
the realm of commerce in the ordinary
and usual sense of that term5° (emphasis
added).
In dissent, Justice Breyer powerfully argued
that gun violence greatly impacts public education
and thus interstate commerce. 5' Yet this seamless
substantive argument failed to meet the minimum
requirements of any coherent theory of the balance
of power that is necessarily imposed by federalism.
As Kennedy and O'Connor replied:
In a sense any conduct in this
interdependent world of ours has an
ultimate
commercial
origin
or
consequence, but we have not yet said the
commerce power may reach so far. If
Congress attempts that extension, then at
the least we must inquire whether the
exercise of national power seeks to
intrude u on an area of traditional state
concern.
50

Id. at 580, 583 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring)
(emphasis added).
51 Id. at 615-31 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg, JJ.,
dissenting).
52 Id. at 580 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
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In other words, the limit imposed on
congressional powers by the enumeration of those
powers is reinforced by the fact that, in our system,
states alone have a police power. 53 As the Chief
Justice wrote, "Under our federal system, the States
possess primary authority54 for defining and
enforcing the criminal law."
53 The police power is defined as "an authority conferred by

the American constitutional system in the Tenth Amendment
The power of the State to place
upon the individual states ....

restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of
persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and
morals or the promotion of the public convenience and general
prosperity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
See Newbem, supra note 10, at 1617-18 (on the Tenth
Amendment). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (stating that "[t]o
uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to
pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair
to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States").
54
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3, 564 (stating that "areas such as
criminal law enforcement" are areas "where the States
historically have been sovereign"). As Hamilton wrote,
"[tihere is one transcendent advantage belonging to the
province of the State governments... the ordinary
administration of criminal and civil justice." The FEDERALIST
No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), 120 (C. Rossiter, ed., 1961).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ.,
concurring) (writing that "the statute now before us forecloses
the States from experimenting and exercising their own
judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of
history and expertise"). It is noteworthy that for most of
American history, marijuana was regulated by colonial or state
law. A 1619 Virginia statute even requiredevery household to
grow hemp. See Schlosser, supra note 26, 19-25; EDWARD
BLOOMQUIST, MARIJUANA: THE SECOND TRIP 27-28 (1971).
See Newbern, supra note 10, 1581-85, 1627 (discussing
explosion of federalization of crime since 1970 and noting the
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Morrison involved a provision of the federal
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that
provided a civil remedy for gender-motivated
violence. 55 Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia
Tech, claimed that another student raped her and
made statements showing a gender motivation for
the attack. She sued him under the VAWA, and the
District Court dismissed the action, partly on
grounds that the civil remedy was beyond
Congress' commerce power. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, as did the Supreme Court. Speaking for
the same five-four majority as in Lopez, the Chief
Justice wrote, "[A] fair reading of Lopez shows that
the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at
issue was central to our decision in that case....
Gender motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity. ' 56 Rehnquist
also indicated that the Court was serious about
enforcing the "noninfinity principle, 57 by
skeptically regarding any interpretation that would
in effect convert
the commerce power into a general
58
police power.
majority of federal drug arrests are for minor street crimes).
See also id. at 1607 (stating that "[a]fter over half a century of
allowing Congress to exercise [a general police power of the
sort retained by the States], the Court finally said 'no' and
decided to rein in the 'Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feellike-Clause"').
5 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2004).
56 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 610, 613. As the Court
wrote, "(i)ndeed,
we can think of no better example of the police power, which
the Founders denied the Federal Government and reposed in
the States, than the suppression of violent crime and
vindication of its victims"). Id. at 618.
57
See Reynolds and Denning, supra note 19, at 1260.
58 Though Morrison figures prominently in our analysis, it
is
distinct from Lopez and Raich in that 42 U.S.C. § 13981 did
not seek to regulate possession, but rather physical violence.
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In Lopez and Morrison,59 the Court identified
three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its commerce power-the use of the
channels of interstate commerce, the use of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and those
that substantially affect interstate
activities
commerce. 60 Judge Beam, who dissented in the
Ninth Circuit Raich opinion, does not dispute Judge
Pregerson's claim that Raich falls within the third
category, 6 1 and so we turn to the test developed in
Lopez, and refined in Morrison, for evaluating
whether a regulated activity "substantially affects"
interstate commerce. 62 In Pregerson's words, the
test is:
the statute regulates
(1) whether
commerce or any sort of economic
whether the statute
enterprise; (2)
contains any "express jurisdictional
element that might limit its reach to a
discrete set" of cases; (3) whether the
statute or its legislative history contains
"express
congressional
findings"
regarding the effects of the regulated
activity upon interstate commerce; and (4)
whether the link between the regulated
on
activity and a substantial effect
63
interstate commerce is "attenuated.,
See Jones, 529 U.S. 848. See also Reynolds and Denning,
supra note 19, at 1261 (Jones decided same day as Morrison,
59

and it "shores up some of the supporting timbers of Lopez").
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; Morrison 529 U.S. at 60809.
61 See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229.
62 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-13.
63 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229 (citations omitted).
60
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Citing United States v. McCoy, 64 Pregerson
observes, "[T]he 65first and the fourth factors are the
most important."
2. Judge Beam's Thesis
Although the Lopez/Morrison test has been
criticized as lacking clarity and the force of
precedent, 66 these cases embody the law in this area
McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115. In this case, a mother who
possessed a photograph of herself and her ten year old
daughter "partially unclothed, posed side by side for the
camera, with their genital areas exposed," was convicted
under a federal law prohibiting the possession of child
pornography. The Ninth Circuit invalidated the conviction on
grounds that the photograph had "not been mailed, shipped, or
transported interstate and [was] not intended for interstate
distribution, or for any economic or commercial use ....
Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228 (citing McCoy at 1115).
65 See Raich, 353 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Morrison, at 610-12,
and McCoy, 823 F.3d at 1119, 1129). As for the second
factor, Judge Pregerson observed that "no ...
jurisdictional
hook exists in relevant portions of the CSA," Raich, 352 F.3d
at 1231. As far as the third factor, the Court in Lopez and
Morrison downplayed the force of congressional findings
where Congress otherwise appears to have exceeded its
commerce power.
66 See Kreit, supra note 10, at 1808 (stating that
"while
striking, the Court's revival of the Commerce Clause doctrine
has also come without expressly overturning old law, or
announcing new law. This has led to a great deal of confusion
about the reach of the new Commerce Clause"). See also
Reynolds and Denning, supra note 19, at 1258. As Gouldin
observes of Lopez and Morrison:
64

[T]he precedential value of these cases should
not be overstated. The interpretation of the
leanings of the Justices and application of the
holding to future cases is an inherently
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and are the proper basis for evaluating and
responding to Judge Beam's core thesis. Judge
Beam asserts that the facts in Raich are
indistinguishable from those in Wickard6 7 and that
Lopez and Morrison "expressly affirm the
continuing validity of Wickard., 68 There are two

fatal flaws with Beam's argument, however: first,
Raich is indistinguishable from Lopez for
Commerce Clause purposes; second, Raich is
distinguishable
from Wickard for Commerce Clause
69
purposes.

(a) Raich is indistinguishable from Lopez
for Commerce Clause purposes
To lay the foundation for applying the first
Morrison factor, Pregerson defined the "class of
activities" in which appellants are engaged as the
"intrastate,
noncommercial
cultivation
and
possession of cannabis for personal medical
purposes., 70 He conceded that the Ninth Circuit
upheld the CSA's application in past Commerce
speculative undertaking ....

The highly

charged political and moral debate over drug
policy in the United States makes it more
difficult to predict how the Court would decide
a case that threatened to upset the federal drug
control scheme.
Gouldin,
supra note 10, at 512-13.
67
Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235, 1243 (Beam, J., dissenting).

68

Id. at 1239 (Beam, J., dissenting).

69 My two replies partly converge, insofar as Lopez struck

down § 922(q), notwithstanding the holding in Wickard. If
Pregerson is correct that Raich is indistinguishable from
Lopez, then the reach of the CSA attempted in Raich is
likewise properly invalidated, notwithstanding the holding in
Wickard.
70 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228-29.
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Clause challenges. 7 1 However, he justified his
narrow definition of the class of activities by citing
to Mc Coy.72 He further noted that none of the Ninth
Circuit cases presented the Commerce Clause issue
that exists in Raich in pure form. He wrote:
• . . [N]one of the cases in which the

Ninth Circuit has upheld the CSA on
Commerce Clause grounds involved
the use, possession, or cultivation of
marijuana for medical purposes. [By
contrast] ... here the appellants are not

only claiming that their activities do
not have the same effect on interstate
commerce as activities in other cases
where the CSA has been upheld.
Rather, they contend that, whereas the
earlier
cases
concerned
drug
71See

United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir.
1996); United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370 (9th Cir., 1996);
United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990).
72 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228-29 (stating that "[a] narrow
categorization of the appellants' activity is supported by our
recent decision in... McCoy..

.",

and continuing:

[U]nder McCoy, the class of activities at issue in this
case can properly be defined as the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of
marijuana for personal medical purposes on the
advice of a physician and in accordance with state
law. This class of activities does not involve sale,
exchange, or distribution.)
See also Gouldin, supra note 10 at 517-18; Susan Klein, A
Colloquium on Community Policing:Independent-Norm
Federalismin Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1541, 1590
(2002).
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trafficking, the appellants' conduct
constitutes a separate and distinct class
activities:
of
noncommercial

intrastate,
the
and
cultivation

possession of cannabis for personal
medical purposes as recommended by a
to valid
patient's physician pursuant
73
Californiastate law.

Having defined the class of activities,
Pregerson next addressed the first Morrison factor:
whether the statute regulates commerce or any sort
73 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227-28 (emphasis added). Indeed, postLopez lower federal court rejections of Commerce Clause
challenges to CSA § 841(a)(1), as applied, have virtually
never involved the narrow question of whether Congress can
regulate mere intrastate possession and personal medicinal use
of marijuana. These cases have involved one or more of the
following: (a) another substance, usually cocaine or
methamphetamine, (b) use of a firearm while engaged in a
drug transaction, (c) possession of a controlled substance
within 1000 feet of a school, (d) conspiracy, or (e) drug
trafficking. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 288 F.3d 359
(8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Koons, 300 F.3d 985 (8th Cir.
2002); United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1998);
United States v. Patterson, 140 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 1997);
Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Zorilla, 93 F.3d 7 (1st Cir., 1996); United States v.
Smith, 920 F.Supp. 245 (D. Me. 1996). See generally,
Neusch, supra note 10, at 235-43. The last of the Ninth
Circuit cases cited above, U.S. v. Visman, was pre-Lopez, and
so provides no guidance in resolving Raich.
For an assessment of lower courts' compliance with Lopez and
Morrison in a variety of Commerce Clause contexts, see
Reynolds and Denning, supra note 19, at 1297-99. Whatever
problems there may be with lower court applications of Lopez
and Morrison, they are irrelevant for our purposes since we
are concerned only with what the Supreme Court should do in
this case.
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of economic enterprise. Both this inquiry and that
concerning the class of activities concern, inter alia,
whether or not the activity in question is
"commercial." Thus, Pregerson wrote:
As applied to the limited class of
activities presented by this case, the
CSA does not regulate commerce or
any sort of economic enterprise. The
cultivation, possession, and use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes and
not for exchange or distribution is not
properly characterized as commercial
or economic activity. Lacking sale,
exchange, or distribution, the activity
does not possess
the essential elements
74
of commerce.
Accordingly, in light of key precedent, the
private possession and use of marijuana cannot be
considered "commerce" regulable by federal law.
Although the seeds, soil, planters, and lights
required to produce a marijuana plant could have
moved in interstate commerce, Lopez drew a crucial
line, rooted in the balance of power which
federalism demands.
Mere possession, without
more, is not economic activity under the Commerce
Clause. If possession of a gun, as in Lopez, and
74 Raich, 352

U.S. at 1229-30 n.3 (emphasis added) (adding

further that "although the Doe appellants are providing
marijuana to Raich, there is no "exchange" sufficient to make
such activity commercial in character"). Though Oakland
Cannabis also involved the CUA, the activity regulated in that
case was sale and distribution, which is clearly commercial
activity. 532 U.S. 483. Even if the Court had reached the
Commerce Clause issue in that case, its ruling would be
irrelevant where, as here, there is no economic activity.
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commission of malum in se physical violence, as in
Morrison,75 do not qualify as economic activity,
then Pregerson was correct that the peaceful,
private, merely malum prohibitum possession and
76
medicinal use of marijuana also does not qualify.
In response, Judge Beam, analogizing to
Wickard, noted that Raich's marijuana could be sold
in the marketplace.7 7 He asserted that appellants
"ignore the fungible economic nature of the
substance at issue - marijuana plants - for which
there is a well-established and variable interstate
market. 7 8 Under the same rationale, Mr. Lopez
75Morrison, 529

U.S. at 617 (rejecting the argument "that
Congress may regulate noneconomic violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce").
76
See RAND, supra note 10, at 64 (describing marijuana use
as merely malumprohibitum). See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1230
(holding that Raich's activity was not commerce and that the
Wickard "aggregation principle" is simply inapplicable).
Under these circumstances, there is simply nothing to
aggregate. One billion times zero still equals zero.
Judge Beam tries to bootstrap Angel Raich's supplier's
act of giving her marijuana into a commercial transaction by
observing that "the consideration the caregivers receive is
knowing that Ms. Raich is purportedly in less pain because of
their efforts." Raich, 352 F.3d at 1240 n.6 (Beam, J.,
dissenting). Such sleight of hand, however, cannot transform
a mere gift into a commercial transaction and thus a legally
enforceable contract. Consideration is defined as "[s]ome
right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some
forebearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered,
or undertaken by the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 277
(5th ed., 1979). The psychic gratification that Judge Beam
suggests does not rise to this level. Even if it did, Beam can
make no such claim against Diane Monson, who grows her
own marijuana. This distinction, we shall see, may provide an
opening for rational reform.
Raich, 352 F.3d at 1239, 1242 (Beam, J., dissenting).
78 Id.

at 1239.
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could also have found a purchaser for his gun. That
possibility, however, did not transform possession
of that gun into commerce.79
Indeed, the
implications of a legal principle under which the
possibility of an event is equated with that event are
80 and Kafkaesque. 8 1
staggering-both Orwellian
Under this principle, if a person could commit a
crime, we can assume for legal purposes that the
person has. Beam was on particularly
weak ground
82
in relying on such a principle.
Having dealt with the first Morrison factor,
Judge Pregerson then addressed the second
Morrison factor: whether the link between the
regulated activity and its substantial effect on
interstate commerce is attenuated. He asserted that
this is the case in Raich, observing that "[a]s the
photograph in McCoy stood in contrast to the
commercial nature of the larger child pornography
industry, so does the medical marijuana at issue in
79 Though Judge Reinhardt in McCoy argues that the
photograph in question was not fungible, see McCoy, 823 F.3d
1122, it is by no means clear that buyers for such an object
could not be found.
See generally, GEORGE ORWELL, 1984.
81See generally, FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL.
80

82

Ignoring another key distinction, Beam argues that

Pregerson's attempt to distinguish Raich from Proyect v.
United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1996), fails. Proyect

involved over 100 marijuana plants, thus establishing a
reasonable inference of intent to traffic. See Proyect, 101 F.3d

at 13. Though the DEA seized only six plants from Diane
Monson, Beam writes that "[o]ver time it is likely that many
times over 100 plants will be consumed by [Raich and
Monson] alone." Raich, 352 F.3d at 1239 n. 5 (Beam, J.,
dissenting). In other words, for constitutional purposes,
possession for merely personal use can simply be equated with
possession with intent to traffic. Such an attempt to paper
over a key distinction cuts directly against the thrust of Lopez.
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this case stand in contrast to the larger illicit drug
trafficking industry."83 In response, Judge Beam
quoted a Fourth Circuit ruling that "Lopez expressly
reaffirmed the principle that 'where a general
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to
of individual
commerce, the de minimis character
'8 4
instances is of no consequence'. "
There are at least two problems with this reply.
First, the above quote is taken out of context. Far
from reaffirming the principle cited by Judge Beam,
the Lopez Court's thrust was in the opposite
direction. The full quote was:
[T]he [Maryland v.] Wirtz Court had held
that "neither here nor in Wickard has the
Court declared that Congress may use a
relatively trivial impact on commerce as
an excuse for broad general regulation of
state or private activities .

. . ."

Rather,

"the Court has said only that where a
general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances
that statute is of no
arising under
85
consequence.
Secondly, even beyond this contextual
problem, the statement on which Beam relies seems
to be legerdemain. As we have seen, it is the
activity that Congress seeks to regulate that must
bear a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
If it does not, then one cannot simply assert that the
83 Raich, 352 F.3d at 1230.

4Id. at 1240 (quoting United States v. Leshuk, 65 F. 3d 1105,
1112 (4th Cir. 1995)).
85 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

30

GONZALES V. RAICH

337

statute bears such a relation.86 If the activity
Congress seeks to regulate is not commerce, then by
definition the statute bears no relation to commerce.
On these bases alone, I submit that Judge
Pregerson was correct on the merits. Neither of the
two key factors developed in Lopez and refined in
Morrison was met, and so application of the CSA to
appellants is beyond Congress' commerce power.
The Supreme Court justifiably drew a line in Lopez
that it reinforced in Morrison, and Pregerson is
correct that appellants' activity in Raich falls on the
same side of that line as did the activity reached by
the laws in those cases.
Yet, there is a third problem with Judge
Beam's argument that Raich satisfies the second
Morrison factor. It concerns the meaning of the
words "effect on interstate commerce." As we saw,
Wickard held that "even if appellee's activity be
local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce ....87 To
understand more fully the weakness of Judge
Beam's position, we now turn to his analysis of
Wickard.

The same is true of the activity in Raich: the CSA is a
criminal regulation and not an economic one. Therefore,
marijuana grown and used at home could be deregulated
without undercutting the rest of the CSA.
87 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
86

31

338

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL. I: 3

(b) Raich is distinguishable from Wickard
for Commerce Clause Purposes
Raich is
that
claims
Beam
Judge
To be sure,
indistinguishable from Wickard.
marijuana grown at home for personal consumption
seems like wheat grown at home for personal
consumption. As Beam notes, quoting Wickard,
"[I]t supplies a need of the man who grew it which
would otherwise be reflected by purchases on the
Further, Wickard held that
open market." 88
intrastate, noncommercial activity is still sometimes
reachable under the commerce power. 89 There are,
however, two problems with Beam's comparison of
Raich with Wickard.
The first problem is evident in Beam's claim
that "as with the wheat consumed by the Filbums
[in Wickard], plaintiffs are supplying their own
needs, here symptom-relieving drugs, without
having to resort to the outside marketplace. This
deportment 90obviously has an effect on interstate
commerce."
Raich, 352 F.3d at 1239 (Beam, J., dissenting) (quoting
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111).
89 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
88

90

Raich, 352 F.3d at 1240. The same confusion is evident in
Beam's observation that Congressional findings in the CSA
included the finding that "local distribution and possession of
controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate
traffic in such substances." Id. at 1241-42 (Beam, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
Regarding the third Morrison factor, the existence of
congressional findings, Beam observes that "Congress
contemplated individual growers, possessors, and users when
it made its findings regarding the CSA." Id. at 1242 (Beam,
J., dissenting) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801(4)). Pregerson,
however, notes:
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In the aggregate, to be sure, an individual's
cultivation, possession and personal use of
marijuana will likely have an "effect on interstate
commerce." That "effect," however, is a decrease
rather than an increase in the volume of the
interstate market, an inescapably vital distinction
for Commerce Clause purposes. Where activity
decreases the volume of illicit interstate marijuana
traffic, Congress lacks even a legitimate, and
certainly not compelling, interest in addressing the
"problem." Far from undermining any rational
91
congressional goals, the activity advances them.
[T]hese findings are primarily concerned with the
trafficking or distribution of controlled substances
....[Further,] there is no indication that
Congress was considering anything like the class
of activities at issue here when it made its
findings. The findings are not specific to
marijuana, much less intrastate medicinal use of
marijuana that is not bought or sold and the use of
which is based on the recommendation of a
physician ....[Moreover,] Morrison counsels
courts to take congressional findings with a grain
of salt.
Id. at 1232.
This seems correct, as it is untenable that Congress can
regulate anything it wants simply by issuing "findings." As
the court in Lopez notes, "simply because Congress may
conclude that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so." Lopez,
514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring)). On this point, see Neusch, supra note 10, at
248.
91Along these lines, relying on Lopez' distinction of § 922(q)
from any "essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme would be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated," Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 561, Beam suggests that making appellants' activity a
federal crime is "an essential part of the regulation of some
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In contrast to Wickard, there is not a problem that
Congress needs to remedy. 92 Raich's lack of need
to buy marijuana is simply not a concern of
Congress that justifies its power to make her mere
possession and use of it a federal crime. The cited
"effect on interstate commerce" is but a pretext for
Congress to regulate activity properly addressed93by
the states, if necessary, under their police power.
The second problem with Beam's thesis is that
the laws by which Congress sought to reach the two
activities serve very different functions.
As
Rehnquist wrote in Lopez:

commercial activity," Raich, 352 F.3d at 1240 (Beam, J.,
dissenting). As indicated, however, Congress' purposes are
advancedwhere appellants and others in their position need
not purchase marijuana.
92 The same confusion is evident in Proyect. See Proyect, 101
F.3d at 14, n. 1. As Gouldin notes, "[T]he problem for
Congress is lessened. If everyone grew their own marijuana,
the interstate market would disappear, and current
congresssional justifications for regulation would likewise
evaporate." Gouldin, supra note 10, at 519. Justices Scalia
and Stevens conceded this point at oral argument. See Oral
Arg., at 6-8, as well as Neusch, supra note 10, at 251, and
Newbern, supra note 10, at 1623.
93 Granted, Rehnquist uses the word "affect" with respect to
interstate commerce, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, yet his point is
that Lopez' gun possession neither increasednor decreased
the volume of interstate commerce. It is interesting that Judge
Beam even admits that he does not "believe that the
commodity involved in Wickard was composed of any parts
that had ever moved in interstate commerce." Raich, 352 F.3d
at 1243 (Beam, J. dissenting). Yet, because "the grain was
still deemed by the Supreme Court to be the proper subject of
congressional regulation through the commerce power," id.,
he woodenly, and in flat defiance of the thrust of Lopez, insists
that Wickard controls.
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[E]ven Wickard, perhaps the most far
reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity, involved
economic activity in a way that
possession of a gun in a school zone does
not ....
[T]he Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938 ... was designed to regulate
the volume of wheat moving in interstate
and foreign commerce 94
in order to avoid
surpluses and shortages.
As this suggests, the Agricultural Adjustment Act
was part of Congress' New Deal efforts to stabilize
the price of wheat during the depression by
regulating the volume of wheat in interstate
commerce. The CSA, by contrast, seeks to destroy
an interstate market by criminalizingthe activity in
question. 95 Indeed, Beam simply repeats the words
"open market" used in Wickard; yet, there is no
"open market" for marijuana similar to the legal
market in which Filbum could have purchased
wheat for personal consumption. 96 Beam simply
94

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. As Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
add, "Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the
assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose
to build a stable national economy." Id. at 574 (Kennedy and
O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
95 As we saw, Lopez's distinction between economic and
criminal activity was heightened in Morrison. See Newbem,
supra note 10, at 1620. As Kreit observes, "[T]he CSA does
not seek to control the price of marijuana but rather to prevent
its interstate distribution entirely." Kreit, supra note 10, at
1824.
96 As Gouldin notes, the "analogy between growing marijuana
for personal use and the cultivation of wheat for household use
... ignores the critical differences between effects on a
legitimate market and on a black market." Gouldin, supra
note 10, at 514.
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equates, for Commerce Clause purposes, economic
regulation and criminal prohibition. Yet, given the
Lopez Court's twin emphases on the limits of
Congress' powers and the states' traditional
responsibility for administering criminal law under
their exclusive police power, 97what is permissible
for Commerce Clause purposes in one situation
cannot simply be assumed permissible in the other.
That
case must be made, and Beam did not make
8
it.

9

To conclude, Judge Pregerson had the better
argument. Where the activity in question is purely
intrastate, noncommercial, and not an essential part
of a larger regulatory scheme, as in Lopez and
97 Beam tries to smuggle in another basis for Congress'

regulation of the activity in question by noting that in United
States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990), the court
deferred to Congress' findings on the public health impact of
intrastate drug activities. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1240. Health
policy, however, is also traditionally left to the States under
the police power. See Kreit, supra note 10, at 1820-21.
98 Contrary to Beam's claim, thus, just as Judge Reinhardt
held McCoy distinguishable from Wickard, see McCoy, 823
F.3d at 1122-23, Raich is also distinguishable from Wickard.
In passing, let us observe that in his attempt to ignore
recent precedents in favor of exclusive reliance on Wickard, a
60 year old case, Beam nowhere addressed the fundamental
structural reason for the necessity of clear limits, under our
federalism, on Congress' permissible reach under its
commerce power, as articulated in Lopez and Morrison. He
thus overlooks the balance that must exist in any viable, stable
human institution, including a political constitution. The
legislative and the executive powers are thus like two human
legs that necessarily work together and cannot be clearly
understood without the other. Given the dangers of
concentrated power, there must be substantial balance between
two power centers, whether they are different branches of the
same level of government, or different levels of government,
as in federalism.
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99
McCoy, it is beyond Congress' commerce power.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm the
Ninth Circuit's ruling that the CSA is
unconstitutional as applied to appellants.
By
upholding Judge Pregerson's decision, the Court
would provide much needed coherence and
continuity to its Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 00

III. Solicitor General Clement's Reply and its
Implications
A. The Irrelevance of Medicinal Use to the
Commerce Clause Merits
At this point, we must note something about
Pregerson's opinion that Mr. Clement has
predictably tried to use to his advantage. Whenever
Pregerson describes appellants' activity in relation
to the commerce power, he emphasizes key
features, e.g., that it is "instrastate, .... personal use,"
"noncommercial," and "under a valid state law." At
every opportunity, however, he also mentions, and
usually elaborates upon, the medicinal purpose of

99 As Herman writes, "[W]hen one examines the CSA under
the heightened standards the Court set forth in Lopez and
Morrison, it becomes clear that the Act, as applied to the

wholly intrastate cultivation, possession, and use of medical
marijuana is highly constitutionally suspect, if not wholly
unconstitutional." Caroline Herman, Whatever Happened to
Federalism? UnitedStates v. Oakland CannabisBuyers'
Cooperative,93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 121, 122 (2002).

100 As Justices Kennedy and O'Connor note, "[T]he Court as
an institution and the legal system as a whole have an
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause

jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point." Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 574 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
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appellants' activity
and its use under a physician's
0
'
recommendation. '
In presenting the facts, for example, Pregerson
underscores that Raich suffered from ten serious
medical conditions and that she had tried dozens of
alternative, legal medicines that failed her.' 02 In
defining appellants' "class of activities," he thrice
03
mentions that it was "for medical purposes."'
When contrasting Raich to Proyect v. United States,
he notes that "while Proyect argued that the

marijuana was only for his personal consumption,
he did not allege that it was for medicinal
purposes. ' 04 Finally, with respect to congressional
findings supporting the CSA, Pregerson writes that
"the findings are not specific to marijuana, much
less intrastate medicinal use of marijuana that is not
bought or sold and the use of which
is based on the
05
physician."'
a
of
recommendation
101In

speaking to this precise point in Conant, it bears noting,

Pregerson's Ninth Circuit colleague Judge Kozinski does the
same thing. Conant,309 F.3d at 647 (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
102 See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1225.
103Id. at 1227-28.
'04 Id. at 1230, n.4.
105 Id. at 1232. To illustrate further, consider the following
passage from Pregerson's opinion:
Clearly, the way in which the activity or class of
activities is defined is critical. We find that the
appellants' class of activities-the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of
marijuana for personal medical purposes on the
advice of a physician-is, in fact, different in kind
from drug trafficking. For instance, concern
regarding users' health and safety is significantly
different in the medicinal marijuana context,
where the use is pursuant to a physician's
recommendation. Further, the limited medicinal
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To be sure, Pregerson's emphasis on the
medicinal purpose of appellants' marijuana use is
understandable. For one thing, such a purpose
ensures that the plaintiffs' activities are within the
scope of a valid state law, which is essential to their
position's legitimacy.
Secondly, describing the
"class of activities" as narrowly as possible seems
to bolster Pregerson's holding that appellant's
activities are beyond the reach of the CSA. Third,
whether marijuana use is for medicinal rather than
recreational purposes is a key policy issue. Polls
suggest that many who support legalizing medical
marijuana draw the line at recreational use,' 06 and
use of marijuana as recommended by a physician
arguably does not raise the same policy concerns
regarding the spread of drug abuse. Moreover, this
limited use is clearly distinct from the broader
illicit drug market-as well as any broader
commercial market for medicinal marijuanainsofar as the medicinal marijuana at issue in this
case is not intended for, nor does it enter, the
stream of commerce.
Id. at 1228.
Here, Pregerson claims to give three reasons that
appellants' activities are distinct from drug trafficking for
Commerce Clause purposes, but only the third is relevant to
the constitutional issue. The first two reasons are concerns
properly left to the states where the activity in question is
otherwise not federally regulable under the Commerce Clause.
The first reason, "concern regarding users' health and safety,"
is, by definition, within the state's police power, and
Pregerson expressly labels the second one a policy concern.
The third reason, by contrast, while relevant to the Commerce
Clause issue, would be true of some regimes of legalized
recreational marijuana use.
106 A TIME/CNN poll found that 80 percent of Americans
favor legalizing marijuana for medical use, and 72 percent
believe those arrested for possessing small amounts of
marijuana should be fined, not jailed. See Joel Stein, The New
Politics of Pot, TIME, Nov. 4, 2002, at 57-8.
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although 12 states have legalized medical marijuana
to date, 10 7 none currently legalize it for recreational
purposes.
While Pregerson's emphasis on appellants'
medicinal purposes is understandable, the Bush
administration argued that it obscures a key
problem. Where a State legalizes the private,
personal possession and use of marijuana, it is
categorically irrelevant to the Commerce Clause
issue whether that use is for medicinal rather than
recreationalpurposes. As the Solicitor General
wrote, "for purposes of defining Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause in enacting the CSA..
. , there is no basis for distinguishing marijuana
production, distribution, or use for purported
medicinal purposes, as opposed to recreational (or
any other) purpose." 10 8
As he added at oral
argument, "if Respondents are right on their
Commerce Clause theory, . . . then I think their
analysis would extend to recreational use of
marijuana, as well as medical use of marijuana...
,,109

In response, Justice Souter suggested that
medicinal use can be distinguished from
recreational use based on doctors' claims of the
medical benefits of smoked marijuana for sick
patients. 110 This overlooks, however, that from a
constitutional perspective all that matters is whether
107 See David Savage, Justices Take on Medical Pot Law, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al.
108Brief

for the Petitioners, Ashcroft v. Raich, supra note 24,

at 40. While he thus raised the issue in his brief, Mr. Clement
did not draw out its implications, rather simply declaring that
the CSA reaches the medicinal use of cannabis. Id.
9 OralArg., at 15.
"0 See id., at 23-25.
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the activity Congress seeks to criminalize
constitutes interstate commerce. Whatever motive
different people may have in engaging in the
activity, or benefits they may derive therefrom, the
activity itself - in this case, the private, personal
adult possession and use of marijuana - remains the
same.
The possession and consumption in
question have as little or as much impact on
interstate commerce either way. Judge Pregerson
nowhere addresses this problem, and neither his
intentions nor his repetitions make it disappear.
That the medicinal/recreational distinction has great
policy moment does not bestow
constitutional
2
fact."
a
not
is
wish
A
significance.
Mr. Clement could thus have argued that if the
Court upholds the Ninth Circuit ruling that
appellants' private possession and use of marijuana
for medicinal purposes are beyond Congress' reach,
this immunity exists regardless of whether that use
is medicinal. Such a ruling, he could have argued,
will unavoidably enable States to legalize the
possession and use of marijuana, and indeed any
Schedule I drug, purely for recreational purposes.
We should not assume that Mr. Clement would
have overplayed his hand with this point. To be
sure, he might have been tempted to warn that
upholding the Ninth Circuit would yield a
nightmare scenario in which States legalize
1" Even where motive can plausibly determine whether an
activity is commercial or not, monetary gain is the prime
motive in neither medicinal nor recreational use, and so this
line of argument is unavailable.
112 As it turns out, like many lower federal court §841(a)(1)
rulings, Raich does not present the Commerce Clause issue in
pure form. Stripped of the constitutionally irrelevant
dimension of "medicinal purpose," the question is laid bare.
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marijuana for minors, cocaine and heroin for adults,
cocaine and heroin for minors, Amsterdam-style3
"cafes," public opium dens, and "Needle Parks.""
Yet he knows that some such regimes would impact
interstate commerce in a way reachable by
Congress. Even among those that would not,
fIrther, it is virtually impossible as a practical
matter that any State would enact some of them.
As for minors, for example, special protections
and disabilities for minors are strewn throughout
U.S. law for reasons well understood, 1 4 and there is
no good reason to assume things would be different
with the legalization of certain drugs. As for
cocaine and heroin, notwithstanding the DEA's
representations to the contrary,' 15 Americans
understand that these substances are far more

113See RAND, supra note 10, at 281-86. See also U.S.

Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Speaking Out Against Drug Legalization, Mar. 2003, at
http://www.dea.gov, at 3 (hereinafter DEA) (last visited June
12, 2005).
114 See RAND, supra note 10, at 63. All states impose age
limits for the purchase of alcohol. Beyond this, a contract with
a minor is voidable at the option of that minor. In First
Amendment law, time, place and manner restrictions may be
imposed on otherwise protected speech in the interest of
protecting minors. In the law of negligence, standards of the
duty of care differ depending on the defendant's age. Finally,
in family law, the welfare of the child is a primary criterion for
the resolution of custody disputes.
115 Both the DEA and ONDCP websites refer in many places
simply to "drug use" and "drug addiction" without
distinguishing between marijuana on the one hand and cocaine
and heroin on the other. See generally the Office of National
Drug Control Policy (hereinafter ONDCP), at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/ (last visited September
4, 2005); DEA, supra note 113.
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dangerous and addictive than marijuana." 16 Indeed,
even private adult recreational use of marijuana
goes too far for many Americans. 117
Any
suggestion that States would legalize everything
under the sun is unsupported by what we know of
actual behavior.
1. The Personal Cultivation Initiative
Yet let us give Mr. Clement his due. Let us
concede that, given the chance, some states would
seriously consider legalizing the private cultivation,
possession and use of marijuana for recreational
As MacCoun and Reuter note, "[flor purposes of the
legalization debate, marijuana is the cutting edge drug, the
only politically plausible candidate for major legal change."
RAND, supra note 10, at 341. Even James Q. Wilson
distinguishes marijuana for these purposes. See J.Q. Wilson,
Against the Legalization of Drugs, COMMENTARY, Feb.,
1990, at 21, 23.
That the distinction between marijuana and the harder
drugs is well and widely understood is reflected in the fact that
"[t]here are two major categories of bills: marijuana-only bills,
and the omnibus legalization bills that would legalize the sale
and possession of virtually all nonmedical substances."
Neustadter, supra note 22, at 390. The basis for this distinction
consists largely of two key ways in which marijuana differs
from these other substances: it has (1) a much higher safety
margin and (2) a much lower dependence potential. See
Robert Gable, Not All Drugs are Created Equal, in FISH,
supra note 22, at 414.
In passing, I do not claim that decriminializing the
private possession of small amounts of other drugs would
constitute insanity, given the well documented, multilevel
costs of the War on Drugs. That vast subject, however, is
beyond the scope of this article. In any case, since few if any
States, given the option, would legalize or decriminalize
cocaine or heroin, it is a moot point for our purposes.
117 See Stein, supra note 106, at 61.
116
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purposes by adults.

Imagine, for instance, that a

state contemplates enacting the following law:
It shall not be unlawfulfor an adult to cultivate
within his domicile up to X cannabisplants per
adult legally residing in that domicile for
consumption solely by adults within that
domicile, notfor sale or trade. 118

Let us call this imaginary law, a variation on
regimes tried or suggested before,1 19 the Personal
Cultivation Initiative (PCI).
Though the PCI
118 So long as this is roughly the substance of the law, it
matters not whether a state enacts it by legislation or
constitutional amendment. Since none of the medical
marijuana laws recently enacted have been enacted by state
legislation, however, the citizen's initiative process would
seem the more likely avenue for such reform. For a defense of
the legitimacy of the initiative process in the context of the
medical marijuana debate, see Newbern, supra note 10, at
1631-32.
119 Several regimes introduced as bills or adopted as law by
States in the 1980's allowed home growing for personal use.
See RAND, supra note 10, at 364-66, and Neustadter, supra
note 22, at 390-91. As one drug advisory council suggested,
"the elimination, as an offense, of personal possession and use
of marijuana.... Growing up to five plants per household for
personal use would also no longer be an offense. This would
apply to a normal residence, but should not apply to schools,
colleges, or private institutions." Drugs and Our Community:
Report of the Premiere's Drug Advisory Council (1996) in
Government & Private Commissions Supporting Marijuana
Law Reform, at http://www.nornl.org/index. Further, as
Schlosser notes, "[i]n 1972, the National Commission on
Marijuana and Drug Abuse . . . unanimously agreed that

possessing small amounts of marijuana in the home should no
longer be a crime. Growing or selling marijuana for profit,
using it in public, or driving under the influence would remain
strictly forbidden." SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 23. As
Sterling adds, "[slince marijuana is easily grown, cultivation
for personal or family use should be allowed without
registration or taxation." Sterling, supra note 22, at 524.
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legalizes a narrowly circumscribes zone of cannabis
use, it would
function
in
effect
like
decriminalization.12 Though the PCI legalizes a
narrowly circumscribed zone of cannabis use, 12it1
would, in effect, function like decriminalization.
Further, since it bans the sale or exchange of
marijuana (unlike some proposals for regulated
distribution) otherwise legitimate concerns about
the commercialization of legal marijuana would not

120

Several regimes introduced as bills or adopted as law by

states in the 1980's allowed home growing for personal use.
See RAND, supra note 10, at 364-66, and Neustadter, supra
note 22, at 390-91. One drug advisory council has suggested
"the elimination, as an offense, of personal possession and use
of marijuana ....Growing up to five plants per household for
personal use would also no longer be an offense. This would
apply to a normal residence, but should not apply to schools,
colleges, or private institutions." Drugs and Our Community:
Report of the Premiere'sDrugAdvisory Council (1996) in
Government & Private Commissions SupportingMarijuana
Law Reform, at http://www.norml.org/index. Further, as
Schlosser notes, "In 1972, the National Commission on
Marijuana and Drug Abuse.

.

. unanimously agreed that

possessing small amounts of marijuana in the home should no
longer be a crime. Growing or selling marijuana for profit,
using it in public, or driving under the influence would remain
strictly forbidden." SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 23. As
Sterling adds, "Since marijuana is easily grown, cultivation for
personal or family use should be allowed without registration
or taxation." Sterling, supra note 22, at 524.
121Judge Gray describes decriminalization as follows:
"[T]he
possession, use, and sale of street drugs are still illegal. But as
long as people stay within certain well-known guidelines, and
do not otherwise commit any crimes, the police will 'look the
other way' and not enforce the drug laws." J. GRAY, supra
note 4, at 218. The bottom line is the same: keep it discrete,
and there will be no trouble. For further analysis, see Richard
Evans, What Is "Legalization"? What Are "Drugs"? in Fish,
supra note 24, at 369-75.
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arise. 122 Because the PCI would have as little effect
on commerce as would the activity in Raich, it
would be as immune from the reach of Congress'
has shown
commerce power as Pregerson
appellants' activity under the CUA to be, and for

the same reasons. If anything, the activity protected
by the PCIis even furtherfrom interstate commerce
than Raich's activity under the CUA. The latter
requires a person wishing to use marijuana to obtain
a physician's written recommendation, and a
doctor's visit is virtually always a commercial
transaction. The act of obtaining the doctor's note is
thus quite plausibly "connected with a commercial
transaction."' 2 3 The same can hardly be said of an
adult who decides to grow a cannabis plant next to
the tomatoes and carrots in his garden for his
personal home consumption.
B. The Refined Issue
Any hesitation the Justices might have before
issuing the broad ruling I advocate would likely be
a matter of policy preference. While conscientious
jurists try to separate their policy preferences from
their constitutional interpretation, we know that
they are not always successful. Taking the policy
question head one, then, the issue for the Court 1is
24
whether a state could rationally enact the PCI.
Weighing the risks of the PCI against the costs of
122See RAND, supra note 10, at 326-27, 362-63.
123 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
124Since the United States Constitution, as we have seen,

reserves the police power to the states alone, then where they
are acting within the police power to regulate noneconomic
activity, a presumption of constitutionality is appropriate, such
that their action need only pass the rational basis test.
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the current regime of absolute cannabis prohibition,
could states rationally conclude that the latter
outweigh the former? There are barriers to clear
thinking on drug law reform, to be sure,' 25 yet if the
Justices can honestly say that a state could
rationally enact the PCI, then given the strength of
Pregerson's constitutional argument, they should
26
rule that the states can decide this for themselves.
125

See RAND, supra note 10, at 371-409; James Ostrowski,

DrugProhibitionMuddles Along: How a Failureof
PersuasionHas Left Us with a FailedPolicy, in Fish, supra
note 24, at 363-67.
126 At this point, Mr. Clement might suggest
that in the
modem era, notwithstanding Lopez and Morrison, the Court
should always defer to Congress in Commerce Clause cases,
as it did in response to challenges to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. See Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In
those cases, after all, it was Congress, not the states, that had it
right on the policy merits: because an individual's race is
categorically irrelevant to his character, intelligence, ability, or
any other proper basis of treatment by the private or public
sector (particularly at the core of civil society, as in public
accommodations and public university admissions), state
policies to the contrary were properly prohibited.
Beyond the amusing absurdity of such a conservative
administration making this argument, racial nondiscrimination
is now pass6 as a policy goal. Heart of Atlanta and McClung
involved Title II of the 1964 Act, which bans race
discrimination in public accommodations. While Title VI,
which expressly forbids race discrimination by institutions
accepting federal funds, may seem just as sounds, this is now
wrong. With the Court's recent blessing, public institutions
like the University of Michigan, which receive millions
annually in federal funding, may openly engage in racial
discrimination if they claim that it advances "diversity." See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 139 U.S. 306 (2003). Since Grutter flatly
contradicts the racial nondiscrimination standard expressly
imposed by Title VI, Congress is apparently now obliged to
repeal Title VI as bad policy, replacing the racial
nondiscrimination standard with a "racial discrimination if
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An exhaustive consideration of the PCI's policy
merits would, of course, require a lengthy
discussion that is necessarily beyond our present
scope. For present purposes, I need only show that
the Court could conclude that enactment of the PCI
would not be irrational.
1. The Risks of the Personal Cultivation
Initiative
Let us begin by acknowledging Mr. Clement's
likely claim that the PCI is not without risks. Four
common, related concerns are: (1) the impact of
legalization on minors,' 27 (2) that marijuana is a
"gateway" to harder drugs, 128 (3) that legalization of
cannabis will increase its use, and (4) that today's
marijuana has a much higher potency than that of a
generation or two ago. While these concerns are
not completely unfounded, the Justices could find
that States contemplating the PCI would be justified
in concluding that these risks are greatly
exaggerated. Even granting that they remain, we
must still consider whether those risks are
nonetheless outweighed by the costs of the present
regime.
As for minors, let us concede that it is
generally better for minors not to consume
marijuana (or alcohol, tobacco, or fatty foods).

experts have good reasons" standard. I predict that will

happen the same week Congress reclassifies marijuana under
the CSA.

As the DEA tells us, "The Legalization Lobby claims that
the United States has wasted billions of dollars in its anti-drug
efforts. But for those kids saved from drug addiction, this is
hardly wasted dollars." DEA, supra note 113, at 2.
127

128 See,

e.g., ONDCP, supra note 115, at 9.
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While the DEA assures us that "almost two-thirds
of teens say their schools are drug-free,"' 129 Judge
Gray observes:
[O]ur current system is completely
unable to keep illicit drugs out of our
communities and away from our
children . .

.

. Ask your local high

school or junior college students and
they will tell you... that it is easier for
our children and underage adults to get
illicit drugs
than it is for them to get
130
alcohol.
As Rosenthal, et al., notes:
[Parent groups] regularly complain to
authorities that marijuana is more
available than alcohol to their junior
high and high school children. Laws
forbid storeowners to sell alcohol or
tobacco to minors, so teenagers need to
use phony IDs or find an adult willing
to buy liquor or cigarettes for them.
However, marijuana may be 13only
a
1
away.
ride
bicycle
or
phone call
129 DEA, supra note 113, at 4.
130 j.GRAY, supra note 4, at 50-5 1.
131ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 75-76. As Mike Gray
notes, a University of Maryland survey of high school students
found that the hardest drug to obtain is not marijuana, but
alcohol. See MIKE GRAY, DRUG CRAzY: How WE GOT INTO
THIS MESS AND How WE CAN GET OUT OF IT 188, 191 (1998)

(citing University of Maryland, Center for Substance Abuse
Research, CesarFax 5:42, Oct. 28, 1996). See also
SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 71; HUSAK, infra note 144, at
71-72; ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at 176-77; and Anita
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As for the "gateway theory," even if most
cocaine and heroin addicts previously smoked
marijuana, a one-way correlation does not prove
that marijuana use is either necessary or sufficient
for later addiction to harder drugs. As Mike Gray
observes:
[T]he fallback line for cannabis
prohibition, the moat around the castle,
has always been the idea that marijuana
is a stepping stone to harder drugs. But
here again the actual experience of the
[baby] boomers did not mesh properly
with the official line. Of the seventy
million Americans who smoked the
weed, 98% didn't wind up on anything
harder than martinis. Only a tiny
fraction went on to become heroin or
cocaine addicts, and the cause-effect
connection to reefer for this group was
no more evident 1 32than was the
connection to coffee.'
Hamilton, This Bud's Forthe U.S., TIME, Aug. 23, 2004, at
36-37. Concededly, the PCI might provide some minors an
additional avenue of access to cannabis they would not
otherwise have had, i.e., their parents' plants. Just as a liquor
cabinet can be locked, however, it would not be difficult to
secure such plants. See STERLING, supra note 22, at 517.
132M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 187. Satirist George Carlin

once observed that "mother's milk leads to everything," and as
Sullivan has elaborated:
[Tihe tired argument that pot is a 'gateway' drug to
more serious narcotics is a fallacy. Sure, if you ask
hardened drug addicts whether they started with pot,
they usually say yet. But I doubt many of them are
teetotalers, either. Why wasn't their first beer a
gateway drug? And if you ask a bunch of white-collar
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The RAND report sums up the matter: "[W]e
believe that there is little evidence that expanding
marijuana use does increase the use of other, more
harmful drugs .... [Cannabis] depenalization has

no consequence for the prevalence of cannabis use.
Moreover, it will not increase the use of other drugs
for several reasons. 1 33

As for the claim that legalization of marijuana
will cause its increased use,'

34

the RAND report

notes that "[t]he effects of drug laws on drug use are
considerably more uncertain and complex than is
generally acknowledged by advocates on either side
of the drug policy debate .... There are too many
unknowns to predict the effects of drug legalization
with any specificity."' 35 As one study found,
however, "[T]here
is little evidence
that
decriminalization of marijuana use necessarily leads
' 36
to a substantial increase in marijuana use."'
Another observed:

professionals in their fifties whether they have ever
smoked marijuana, they'd probably say yes as well.
Andrew Sullivan, Enjoy, NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2001, at 6.
133RAND, supra note 10, at 346, 358. Putting the issue into
broader perspective, Martinez adds that "the vast majority of
caffeine, tobacco, and alcohol, or marijuana users do not
advance to stronger drugs." MARTIN MARTINEZ, THE NEW
PRESCRIPTION: MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE 65 (2000).
134 As the DEA says, for example, "[I]f the relatively modest
outlays of federal dollars ($19 billion in 2002) were not made,
drug abuse and the attendant social costs... would be far
greater." DEA, supra note 113, at 12-13.
35RAND, supra note 10, at 100.
136 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, Marijuanaand Medicine:

Assessing the Scientific Base 326 (Janet E. Jay et al. eds.,
1999).
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Between 1973 and 1978, possession of
marijuana was reduced to a
misdemeanor in twelve states, but the
predicted explosion in cannabis use
failed to materialize. The University of
Michigan's annual high school survey.
. showed the seniors in these dozen
states reported no more marijuana use
than their
counterparts in the other
37
states.'
Further, although the Dutch decriminalized
cannabis, "Dutch national rates [of cannabis usage]
now are somewhat lower than those in the United
States ....[T]hroughout two decades of the 1976
policy, Dutch [cannabis] use levels have' 38remained
at or below those in the United States."'
As for the alleged higher potency of today's
marijuana, 139 finally, this is seriously contested. As
a European Union drug monitoring agency recently
reported:
[s]tatements in the popular media that the
potency of cannabis has increased by ten
times or more in recent decades are not
supported by the limited data that are
available from either the USA or Europe.
The greatest long-term changes in potency
appear to have occurred in the USA. It
should be noted here that before 1980
137

L.D. Johnston et al, MarijuanaDecriminalization:The

Impact on Youth 1975-1980 in UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, MONITORING THE FUTURE,
OCCASIONAL PAPER 13.
138 RAND,

supra note 10, at 256, 263.

139See DEA, supra note 113, at 9, and ONDCP, supra note

115, at 4.
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herbal cannabis potency in the USA was
very low by European standards.... The
natural variation in the THC content
between and within samples of herbal
cannabis or cannabis resin at any one time
and place far exceeds any long-term
changes that may have
occurred either in
40
Europe or the USA.1
Even putting this report aside, however, and
assuming for the sake of argument that cannabis
140

European Union Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug

Addiction, Overview of CannabisPotency, 2004, at
http://www.csdp.org/research/insights6web.pdf. As Mike
Gray adds:
[D]rug Czar William Bennett was among the
first to break the bad news: the children of the
boomers were facing a far more powerful form
of cannabis than the stuff their parents
experimented with in the sixties .... But once
again, close inspection revealed a flaw in the
official tale. It seems the baseline samples from
the 1970's were not properly preserved, so
there's really no way to tell what their original
THC content was. On top of that, the
government's own long-term study of
marijuana potency at the University of
Mississippi undermined Bennett's argument.
The official numbers showed an average THC
content in marijuana seized by the police since
1981 ranging between 2.3 and 3.8 percent. In
the 1970s on the other hand, independent
analysts found THC averaging 2 to 5 percent
with some samples as high as 14 percent. As
one authority put it, "If parents want to know
what their kids are smoking today, they need
only recall their own experience."
M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 186-87. See also
Hamilton, supra note 131, at 37.
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potency in the USA has greatly increased in the last
generation, two things are notable. First, as Judge
Gerber explains, this increase may be directly
traceable to market responses to the U.S
to
government's efforts in the 1970's and 1980's
14 1
Mexico.
from
smuggled
marijuana
eradicate
Second, even if one who buys cannabis illegally can
likely not know its potency, that risk is eliminated if
he allowed to grow his own cannabis from the seeds
of plants he has already consumed.
While the PCI poses risks, then, they are often
exaggerated and plausibly minimal. Even conceding
some risk, however, this is only part of a State's
basis for rational policymaking in this area. To
complete our assessment of whether the Court could
find that States could rationally enact the PCI, thus,
we turn to the costs of the current regime.
2. The Costs of the Current Regime
Two stark facts in particular would give states
contemplating the PCI considerable pause before
rejecting it. First, while American law completely
prohibits marijuana, to which not a single death has
ever been attributed, 42 it properly regulates
substances far more dangerous than marijuana, like
141 See

Gerber, supra note 10, at 145-46. This dynamic seems

to parallel that of alcohol bootleggers during Prohibition who
recognized that greater profits could be realized at the same
level of risk by smuggling hard liquor instead of beer and
wine. See RAND, supra note 10, at 161.
142 As Harvard Medical Professor Lester Grinspoon has
observed, "[D]espite its use by millions of people over
thousands of years, cannabis has never caused a death." Lester
Grinspoon, Cannabis,the Wonder Drug, in THE DRUG
LEGALIZATION DEBATE 101-02 (James A. Inciardi, ed., 1999).
See also ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 40.
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alcohol, tobacco, 143 firearms, and explosives. 144
Second, by completely prohibiting marijuana, the
Alcohol and tobacco in particular have often been singled
out in this connection. A study recently commissioned by the
U.S. government concluded that "users of marijuana are less
likely to become dependent on the drug in comparison to
alcohol and nicotine." INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note
136, at 98. As for harms beyond dependence, alcohol related
deaths total more than 100,000 per year, and tobacco causes
more than 400,000 U.S. deaths each year. See ROSENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 10, at 40-41, 103.
Several authorities and leading studies thus declare that
marijuana is far less harmful than alcohol and tobacco. In the
words of two reports cited, "An objective consideration of
marijuana shows that it is responsible for less damage to the
individual and society than are alcohol and cigarettes."
143

CALIFORNIA RESEARCH ADVISORY PANEL, Twentieth Annual

Report of the Research Advisory Panel(1989), at
http://www.norml.org. According to an article in The Lancet,
a leading British medical journal, "The smoking of cannabis,
even long-term, is not harmful to health .... It would be
reasonable to judge cannabis as less of a threat ... than
alcohol or tobacco." DeglamorisingCannabis, 346 THE
LANCET1241 (Nov. 14, 1998). See also ERIC GOODE,
BETWEEN POLITICS AND REASON: THE DRUG LEGALIZATION
DEBATE 155 (1997); SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 74; and

Stein, supra note 106, at 61. As MacCoun and Reuter sum
things up:
[T]hough cannabis use is not without harm,
especially for adolescents, as a source of
danger it is certainly trumped by alcohol,
tobacco, reckless driving, criminality, and
unsafe sexual behavior .... [Nonetheless]
there are enormous politicalobstacles to
prohibition ofthese substances; alcohol and
tobacco have much largerand better organized
constituencies than do(es) cannabis .... This
begs the question: why not remove the
inconsistency by changingthe pot laws?
RAND, supra note 10, at 345, 358 (emphasis added).
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Notwithstanding these authorities, the DEA simply
declares in sweeping terms that "[d]rug use can be deadly, far
more deadly than alcohol .... [D]rugs are far more addictive
than alcohol." DEA, supra note 113, at 8, 18. The most
astonishing claim, however, may be the following:
"Legalization proponents claim.., that many people can use
drugs in moderation and that many would choose not to use
drugs, just as many abstain from alcohol and tobacco now. Yet
how much misery can be attributed to alcoholism and
smoking? Is the answer to just add more misery and
addiction?" Id. at 14. This claim, it will be noticed, does not
simply equate the effects of marijuana with the misery and
addiction of alcohol and nicotine, which is patently false, but
it does so in the service of blatant paternalism, which is
antithetical to a free society. If free adults can be trusted to
decide whether to risk the devastation of alcoholism and
tobacco addiction, it is absurd to say they can not be trusted to
decide whether to use marijuana, which is unquestionably far
safer.
144 Two other substances are noteworthy in this connection:
fatty foods and caffeine. As for the former, though access to
fattening foods is not regulated, "in March, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention predicted that obesity will
overtake smoking as the leading cause of preventable deaths in
the United States by next year if current trends continue."
Rashad & Michael Grossman, The Economics of Obesity, 156
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 104. As Husak observes, "[P]eople
overeat and grow obese, their health suffers, they may die
prematurely. None of this is good .... What should be done
about it? What about criminalizing it? ... This is crazy ....
The problem is not large enough to warrant such extreme
infringements of liberty." DOUGLAS HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS!
THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS vii-viii (2002). As for
caffeine:
[T]he risks of caffeine are greater than THC in
every way .... Caffeine is physically
addicting (with headache as the most often
cited symptom) and can cause unnecessary
stress, lightheadedness, breathlessness, and an
irregular heartbeat or much worse in largerthan-average doses. Marijuana isn't even
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United States stands firmly against the recent tide
of
45
practice in other leading western democracies.
These facts standing alone may not sway
rational people on this matter.
They should,
however, lead them to inquire into and seriously
reflect upon the actual costs of our current regime.
While this is a vast subject that cannot be fully
treated here, we can at least summarize some of the
remotely as dangerous-no deaths by overdose,
no physical addiction, and minimal health risks
Gable, supra note 116, at 406 (quoting D. Larsen).
Still, I assert that these substances that are far more
dangerous and addicting than cannabis are properly regulated
without a blanket prohibition. We know how prohibition of
alcohol worked. As for nicotine (equaled in addictive power
only by heroin) prohibition of cigarettes would create a truly
nightmarish black market. See Fish, supra note 22, at 346. In
light of these contrasts, the United States government's claims
of concern for health risks, see ONDCP, supra note 115, at 2;
DEA, supra note 113, at 8-9, and lost productivity, see DEA,
supra note 113, at 11, are exposed as blatant hypocrisy, which
states can be trusted to put into perspective when
contemplating the PCI.
145 This includes several European countries
and Canada. See,
e.g., J.F.O. McAllister, Europe Goes to Pot, TIME, Aug. 20,
2001, at 60-61; EuropeanDrug Policy: Analysis and Case
Studies, at http://www.norml.org/index. As Hamilton
observes, "[A]t the popular New Amsterdam Caf&in
downtown Vancouver, customers openly smoke marijuana...
• If passed within the year, as seems likely, new Canadian
legislation would decriminalize possession of less than 15
grams of marijuana, meaning that offenders would given the
equivalent of a traffic ticket." Hamilton, supra note 131, at
37. MacCoun and Reuter conclude that "this reluctance (of
political candidates to advocate change in U.S. marijuana law)
is particularly a pity because major changes in the United
States would be consistent with a general international trend
toward less aggressive use of the criminal sanction against
marijuana." RAND, supra note 10, at 376.
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economic and social costs of complete marijuana
prohibition. 146 These costs are multidimensional,
largely inextricable, and staggering.
146

As for the constitutional costs of the war on marijuana, an

account of these could fill volumes. See, e.g., ROSENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 10, at ch. 1; ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at chs.
5-6; Newbern, supra note 10, at 1590-94; JOEL MILLER, BAD
TRIP: HOW THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS IS DESTROYING
AMERICA ch. 8 (2004), at chs. 5-6; J. GRAY, supra note 4, at
ch. 3; Robert Sweet & Edward Harris, Moral and
ConstitutionalConsiderationsin Support of the
Decriminalizationof Drugs, in Fish, supra note 22, at 430-84.
This war threatens several fundamental constitutional
interests, including those arising under the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendments, as well as the Tenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Some of these
problems largely overlap with the economic and social costs
we shall consider, however, and they can be expressed as
technical legal objections, as well as "costs." I shall thus
underscore a single way in which our government's
propaganda in this war casually disregards fundamental
Fourteenth Amendment values.
The ONDCP asks, "[W]hy legalize marijuana and add a
third drug to the current list of licit threats?" ONDCP, supra
note 115, at 8. See also DEA, supra note 113, at 18-19. The
answer is that it is blatantly arbitrary simply to decree that the
ravages of alcohol and tobacco, but not the demonstrably
lesser evils of marijuana, will be tolerated simply because the
former are currently legal and have powerful lobbies. The
degree of actual harm a substance causes must be at least a
major criterion for determining whether it will be regulated
rather than completely prohibited. Where it is not, both due
process and equal protection are deeply offended. As Justice
Jackson wrote:
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we
should not forget today, that there is no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require
that the principles of law which officials would
impose upon a minority be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary
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a. Economic Costs
The DEA declares that "legalization [of
marijuana] would result in skyrocketing costs that
would be paid by American taxpayers and
consumers."
The current prohibition regime,
however, includes a range of steep costs, both direct
and indirect. The criminal justice process, of
course, accounts for many of the direct economic
costs. There are approximately seven hundred
thousand marijuana arrests in the United States each
year, 148 and the annual bill for prosecution, defense,
incarceration, and court supervision of such
nonviolent offenders is in the tens of billions of
dollars. 149 As the RAND report notes, "[R]eductions
action so effectively as to allow those officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they
will apply legislation and thus to escape the
political retribution that might be visited upon
them if larger numbers were affected.
R. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13
(1949).
On the liberty due process argument in the context of
Raich, further, see Julie M. Carpenter, Yes, FederalPower is
Limited, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at 34.
147 DEA, supra note 113, at 11.
148 In 2002, there were 697,082 marijuana arrests,
and 6.5
million U.S. marijuana arrests since 1993. Crime in the United
States, FBI Uniform Crime Reports (1993-2002, reported
annually).
14 9 See FAS Drug Policy Analysis Bulletin,
at
http://www.mpp.org/arrests/fas61699 1; Still Crazy After All
These Years: MarijuanaProhibition193 7-1997 at
http://nonnl.org; FBI's combined Uniform Crime Reports:
Crime in the United States (1990-2000), at
http://www.norml.org/index; and ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 10, at 82. See generally,MILLER, supra note 146;
ELDREDGE, supra note 22, ch. 7; ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 10, ch. 3.
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in criminal sanctioning, almost by definition,
produce significant reductions in the criminal
justice costs and burdens, as well as' 150 the
intrusiveness associated with those sanctions."
The indirect economic costs of complete
prohibition are also staggering. Persons imprisoned
for marijuana offenses generate numerous losses,
such as "loss of income, potential welfare costs for
5
dependents, and loss of productivity to society,"' '
as well as loss of tax revenues that these prisoners
and marijuana suppliers would generate if legally
employed. It is a fundamental law of economics
that criminalizing a substance greatly increases its

150

RAND, supra note 10, at 326. As Fish writes:

[L]egalizing marijuana, and releasing from
prison those who are there solely for its
possession, would instantly save huge amounts
of money, end the shortage of prison space,
free up funds for drug treatment, and raise the
possibility that consumers seeking intoxication
might choose it in preference to the much more
dangerous alcohol.
Fish, supra note 22, at 542.
Rosenthal adds that "if marijuana were legal or
civilly regulated, there would be five percent fewer
cops, cop cars, criminal court cases, and prisoners.
The change in policy would result in a direct saving
of $16 billion a year." ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note
10, at 88. It has been estimated that marijuana
decriminalization saves California $100 million in
enforcement costs each year. See Michael Aldrich &
Tod Mikuriya, Savings in CaliforniaMarijuanaLaw
Enforcement Costs Attributableto the Moscone Act
of 1976 - A Summary, 20 J. OF PSYCHOACTIVE
DRUGS at 75-81 (Jan.-Mar. 1988).
151ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 29.
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price, 152 yet criminalizing marijuana does not
appear to decrease its use. . Under the PCI, then,
the $10.6 billion that the ONDCP estimates that
Americans annually spend on cannabis, at prices
dictated by its illegal status, would be spent or
invested elsewhere in the U.S. economy (rather than
the Canadian).
In passing, marijuana suppliers who become
multimillionaires under the current regime 154 must
152

As

Goode observes, "[B]ecause drugs are illegal, they are

expensive and hence, they are hugely profitable to sell."
GOODE, supra note 143, at 152. As the RAND report adds,
"[C]annabis... is extraordinarily expensive relative to its
production cost or what it might cost if legal." RAND, supra
note 10, at 344. As Miller explains, "What appear to be
absurdly high prices are simply the way the market rations
supply and encourages new supplies in response to demand."
MILLER, supra note 146, at 18.
153 According to a 2001 study sponsored by the United States
government, "Existing research seems to indicate there is little
apparent relationship between the severity of sanctions
prescribed for drug use and prevalence or frequency of use,
and that perceived legal risk explains very little in the variance
of individual drug use." Nat'l Research Council, Informing
America's Policy on Illegal Drugs: What We Don'tKnow
Keeps Hurting Us, Nat'l Acad. Press 192-93 (2001). As one
commentator notes:
Between 1988 and 1998, British arrests for
marijuana nearly quadrupled, reaching almost
100,000 a year. As many as 5600 marijuana
offenders were annually imprisoned. And yet
British marijuana use during that period
continued to rise. Despite having the most
punitive marijuana laws in Europe, Great
Britain soon had the highest rateof marijuana
use among young people.
SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 69-70 (emphasis added).
154 See MILLER, supra note 146, at 15-18; ELDREDGE, supra
note 22, ch. 3.
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be understood as economic actors responding
rationally to a market in which the profit potential
exceeds the risks. 155 The PCI would inevitably
destroy most of the illicit market. Since the PCI
prohibits the sale of marijuana, a person buying
marijuana rather than growing it would not only risk
imprisonment, but would have to pay the inflated
price associated with an illegal market. 156 Judge
Gray notes that "[a] black market of some kind will
always be with us, but it can be severely diminished
155
As Miller observes, "These high prices lure entrepreneurs
into the illegal drug markets like honey draws flies." MILLER,
supra note 146, at 16. Mike Gray notes, "[T]he black market
is the purest form of unfettered free-market capitalism. The
rules are Darwinian - survival of the fittest - and no matter
what you do, the pirates will always be a step ahead ....
[Thus,] the only way to destroy the black market is to
underbid it." M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 191. According to
the RAND report:
Depenalization [of cannabis] along with
removal of sanctions for home production and
gifts [within quantity limits - the model used in
South Australia] should substantially weaken
the black market and generate a much greater
reduction in criminal justice costs, with at most
a small effect on prevalence and intensity of
use.

RAND, supra note 10, at 11.
156 As the DEA writes, "[O]nly about 5 percent of inmates in
federal prison are there because of simple possession. Most
drug criminals are in jail - even on possession charges because they have plea-bargained down from major trafficking
offenses .... In New York ....it is estimated that 97% of

drug felons sentenced to prison were charged with sale or
intent to sell, not simply possession." DEA, supra note 113, at
3, 23. By destroying most of the adult market for marijuana,
the PCI would give potential marijuana suppliers much less
opportunity to become "drug felons" whom we must imprison.
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in size and power.' ' 157 Thus, a state could rationally
conclude that the PCI would severely diminish the
size and power of the illicit marijuana market. If
the demand for marijuana is here to stay, 158 and
subject to inexorable economic laws, states could
quite sensibly decide to take advantage of those
laws, rather than be taken advantage of by them.
Given the ongoing costs of homeland security and
the war in Iraq, as well as massive federal budget
deficits and widespread state budget shortfalls, the
Supreme Court could conclude on economic
grounds alone that a state could rationally enact the
PCI.
b. Social Costs
The DEA underscores the social costs of "drug
abuse,"' 159 yet nowhere does it speak to the
devastating social costs of marijuana prohibition.
For one, the current regime drains billions of dollars
that would enable honest law enforcement officials
to combat serious, violent crime, which greatly
16°
affects law-abiding citizens' quality of life.
Beyond this, marijuana prohibition creates
157 j. GRAY, supra note 4, at 243.
158 See ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at 160. As Hamilton

observes, "[T]he U.S. seized more than 48,000 lbs. of
marijuana along the Canadian border last year, nearly double
the 26,000 lbs. it retrieved in 2002." Hamilton, supra note
131,
at 36-37.
159 DEA, supra note 113, at 11.
60

1 Notwithstanding our government's claims that using
marijuana causes one to be violent, see ONDCP, supra note
115, at 5, it is marijuana's illegality that causes the violence
that unavoidably attends the competition for huge profits
where a widespread activity is criminalized. See Hamilton,
supra note 131, at 37.
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incentives for dishonest public officials, especially

given their typically modest salaries, to cooperate
with the illicit drug markets' 61 and to make
budgetary ends meet through draconian forfeiture
laws. 162
Not only does the present regime
undermine respect for and cooperation with law
enforcement,16 3 it also disproportionately burdens
racial minorities and the poor, 164 exacerbating race
161 See generally MILLER, supra note 146, ch. 2; ELDREDGE,

supra note 22, at 54-57; J. GRAY, supra note 4, at 67-77. As
Rosenthal explains:
As with other banned substances from time
immemorial, agencies charged with enforcing
marijuana laws also have to deal with official
corruption. Because of the high risk of the
marijuana basis, those involved in marijuana
sales on a large basis often try to bribe police
officers and other agents. Given the huge sums
of money involved, some portion of the law
enforcement community will always be
seduced.
ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 20. As Mike Gray thus

writes, "Honest cops everywhere are watching in dismay as
their departments are sucked under by payoffs at every level."
M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 190.
162 See SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 61-62. See
generally
MILLER, who notes that "by linking police budgets to law
enforcement, forfeiture laws induce police and prosecutors to
neglect other, more pressing, crime problems .... [Florfeiture
laws create . . . a great temptation for state and local police

departments to target assets rather than criminal activity."
MILLER, supra note 146, at 133 (citations omitted).
163 See, e.g., ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at
14, 71-72.
In the words of the RAND report, "Depenalization of cannabis
... should significantly enhance the perceived legitimacy and
credibility of the government's control efforts against other
illicit drugs." RAND, supra note 10, at 358-59.
164 See, e.g., Steven Jonas, Why the Drug War Will Never End,
in THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE 132-36 (James Inciardi

ed., 1999);

ELDREDGE,

supra note 22, ch. 8;

SCHLOSSER,
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and class antagonisms. In addition, drug pushers
1 65
become millionaires and are viewed as heroes,
which is hardly a message we want to send to
youth. Perhaps most importantly, the CSA's flat
prohibition of marijuana devastates countless
families and individual lives through unnecessary
imprisonment. We considered the economic costs
of the incarceration of tens of thousands of
nonviolent marijuana offenders, but the social costs
of this regime extend to the effects of thrusting a
nonviolent marijuana user into a world of prison
gangs, sexual violence, hard drugs, and learned
criminality. 166 These problems are exacerbated by
prison overcrowding, which also may require the
early release of violent offenders to make room for
nonviolent ones. 167 As the RAND report concludes:
Like President Carter our judgment is
that at present the primary harms of
supra note 26, at 51-52; M. GRAY, supra note 131, at 189;
ROSENTHAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 77-78; RAND, supra
note 10, at 2, 5, 38. As former San Jose Police Chief Joseph
McNamara observes, "Ninety million Americans have tried
marijuana. When you look at who's going to jail, it is
overwhelmingly disproportionate - it's Latinos and Blacks."
Stein, supra note 106, at 61. As Ostrowski concludes, "It is
difficult to resist the temptation to call the war on drugs a war
on blacks." Ostrowski, supra note 125, at 354.
165 See MILLER, supra note 146, at 18; ELDREDGE, supra note
22, at 105-06.
166 See MILLER, supra note 146, at 173-78; ROSENTHAL ET
AL.,
supra note 10, at 75, 77; SCHLOSSER, supra note 26, at 57.
167 As Miller notes, part of the overcrowding problem is
traceable to mandatory minimum sentences for drug
convictions. MILLER, supra note 146, at 164-68. See J. GRAY,
supra note 4, at 36. The very recent case of United States v.
Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) may provide some relief
regarding this problem.
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marijuana use . . . . come from
criminalization,
expensive
and
intrusive enforcement, inequity, shock
to the conscience from disproportionate
sentence, and a substantial [though
generally nonviolent] black market.
This is not to ignore that the drug itself
causes damage ....
But the adverse
consequences of criminalization, with
current U.S.6 8enforcement, seem more
substantial.1
c. The Imperative of Harm Reduction
This brief overview of some risks associated
with the PCI, along with the costs of the current
regime, should be enough to establish that a state
could rationally enact the PCI. It also brings us
back to the fact that the current United States
regime of complete cannabis prohibition runs
counter to the recent trend of other western
democracies. 169 These countries have embraced the
168
169

RAND, supra note 10, at 356-57 (emphasis added).
In Grutter,Justices Ginsberg and Souter rested their

concurrence in part on the use of race preferences in other
countries. While it is debatable whether this is appropriate,
this inclination to take international developments into account
should lead them to seriously consider the results of the
European experience in harm reduction. Indeed, even
Lawrence, authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice

O'Connor, relied on recent international legal trends in more
than one place. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 576,

(2003). McAllister writes, "[Als Europe is learning, it may be
easier to knock down rogue missiles than to beat back a
consensus among allies and neighbors who think it is smarter
to live with cannabis than to fight it." McAllister, supra note
145, at 61.
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goal of harm reduction170 by asking the question: In
the cold light of concrete experience, which does
more harm to the individual and society-the use of
marijuana or the enforcement of a regime of
complete marijuana prohibition? 17 1 For all these
reasons, the Supreme Court should find that states
could rationally decide that the PCI would
yield far
72
less harm than does the current regime. 1
Hippocrates wrote, "First, do no harm." Of course, with
respect to marijuana law reform, this is impossible because
there are risks or harms no matter what. A logical corollary of
the ancient wisdom, however, must be that, where harm can
not be avoided, it must be minimized.
171 Our government assures us that "European experiments
with drug legalization have failed." DEA, supra note 113, at
15. Such a sweeping condemnation, however, gratuitously
oversimplifies a complex phenomenon, implying that Dutch
cannabis reform, for example, has had the same success as the
Swiss "Needle Park" experiment. As the RAND report sums
up, however, "The Dutch have significantly reduced the
monetary and human costs of incarcerating cannabis offenders
with no apparent effect on levels of use." RAND, supra note
10, at 261. See also Mary Cleveland, Downsizing the Drug
War and Considering "Legalization," in Fish, supra note 22,
at 547, 570. For this reason, among others we have seen,
states considering enacting the PCI and investigating the facts
for themselves could conclude that our federal government is
misleading us, if not lying to us, about this matter.
172 Both liberals and conservatives on the Court
will likely
have reservations about ruling as I have advocated. Newbem
refers to the following:
170

The "liberal paradox" - the odd position in
which liberal advocates of state-legalized
medical marijuana use are placed in arguing for
a reduced role for the federal government
against a history that equates such arguments
with a time in which states clung to their
autonomy as means of preserving a racist past.
Newbern, supra note 10, at 1590.
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The Court's liberals, however, should recognize that
marijuana policy is categorically distinct from race policy.
Marijuana legalization, be it for medicinal or recreational
purposes, can simply not be equated with an attempt to
resurrect Jim Crow. If anything, States are now trying to
discriminate in favor of racial minorities, not against them, as
in Grutter.
Under these circumstances, the liberals on a "pragmatic"
Court, see Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have
Lost His Court,N. Y. Times, July 3, 2004, at 3, would be
inclined to be sympathetic toward the CUA and even the PCI
and should finally be willing to concede that Lopez and
Morrison drew a valid line rooted in a division of power for
which the Constitution clearly provides. They should be
willing, that is, to accept what another great liberal Justice
wrote long ago: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The Court's conservatives, by contrast, will struggle
with the unpleasant fact that their federalism revolution may
enable liberal social policy like the CUA and PCI. While
authoritarian conservatives like Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Rehnquist may sufficiently support the war on marijuana and
will argue Judge Pregerson misapplied Lopez and Morrison,
the libertarian inclinations of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
might lead them to rule as I have advocated. To illustrate,
consider Lawrence, in which the Court struck down a State
law criminalizing private consensual homosexual sodomy by
adults as a violation of the right of privacy, which is rooted in
Fourteenth Amendment liberty due process. 539 U.S. 572.
Implicitly relying on Mill's "harm principle," see J.S. MILL,
ON LIBERTY 68 (G. Himmelfarb, ed. 1975), and the distinction
between self regarding and other regarding behavior, see
RAND, supranote 10, at 58-59, Kennedy and O'Connor held
that the activity of adults in the privacy of their home is
beyond the regulatory reach of government. As Kennedy
wrote, "The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced who are
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
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IV. Conclusion
Gonzales v. Raich provides the Supreme Court
with an historic opportunity to enable much needed
reform. The Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit's
ruling that the Controlled Substances Act is
unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds, as it
applies to the appellants. The Court should issue a
broad rather than narrow ruling, acknowledging that
the medicinal purpose of state-legalized marijuana
use is irrelevant to whether it is beyond the reach of
Congress' commerce power, and affirming, or at
least not denying, that states could constitutionally
enact the Personal Cultivation Initiative.
The Personal Cultivation Initiative would
displace but a small comer of the CSA, legalizing
only (1) the cultivation, possession and use, not sale
or trade, of (2) marijuana (3) by adults, (4) in the
home. Further, in ruling as I have advocated, the
Court would not be making substantive policy.
Rather, it would give expression to a coherent
understanding of federalism by leaving the policy
decision to the discretion of states under their police
power. In the process, the Court would provide
continuity and coherence in our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
As suggested at the outset, however, the Court
seems unlikely to issue the broad ruling I have
advocated. It may instead rule narrowly for the
respondents, although I have argued that it would
refused. It does not involve public conduct ....
" Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 578. This substantially describes the activity
protected by the PCI, and the right of privacy recognized in
Lawrence takes on even added force when a State seeks to
protect it, as under the PCI, rather than violate it, as did the
Texas statute.
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err by trying to rest such a narrow ruling on the
medicinal/recreational distinction, irrelevant as it is
to the Commerce Clause question. If the Court is
not prepared to acknowledge that irrelevance, I
submit that it should remain silent on the issue,
allowing lower courts to forge a consensus as this
area of law develops. The crux of a workable
alternative basis for a narrow ruling in respondents'
favor might look like the following:
1) Unlike the federal laws in Lopez and
Morrison, the CSA as applied in Raich neither
complements nor cooperates with State law. To the
contrary, it completely undermines it.
2) The State law in Raich functions to reduce
the volume of a market that federal law seeks to
destroy.
Therefore, Congress has no rational basis to
criminalize the activity protected by the State law in
Raich, and so it is beyond its commerce power.
Whatever the merits of this formulation, we
must recognize that the Court may rule against the
respondents. Some have reported that the Court was
skeptical of Raich and Monson's position at oral
174
argument, 173 and comments by Justices Breyer
173

See, e.g., High CourtAppears Hesitant to Endorse Medical

Marijuana, N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
29,
2004, at
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-ScotusMedical-Marijuana; Tony Mauro, U.S. High Court not High
on Medical Pot, THE RECORDER, Nov. 30, 2004, at 1; Gail
Gibson, Medical Marijuana:Justices Skeptical over Patients'
Use, BALT. SUN, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al; and Linda
Greenhouse, States' Rights Defense Falters in Medical
Marijuana Case, N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
30, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30scotus. As one
observer wrote, "a majority of the justices made comments
suggesting they thought that even small amounts of ostensibly
medical marijuana, obtained for free, were part of a national

70

GONZALES V. RAICH

377

market for licit and illicit drugs - and thus subject to
Congress's constitutional power over trade among the states."
Charles Lane, High Court Not Receptive to Marijuana Case,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at A03.

174 Justice Breyer, of course, penned powerful
dissents in
Lopez and Morrison. As Savage writes, "(a) former Senate
staffer, Breyer has consistently urged the Court to uphold acts
of Congress." Savage, supra note 7, at Al. At oral argument,
accordingly, Breyer did two things.
First, in response to Barnett's claim that respondents'
activity is noneconomic, Breyer responded that "it's noneconomic and it affects the economic." Oral Arg. at 33. This
echoes Breyer's rejection of the economic/noneconomic
distinction, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656-658, and reminds us
why the Chief Justice observed in Lopez that "although Justice
Breyer argues that acceptance of the government's rationales
would not authorize a federal police power, he is unable to
identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress
may not." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. For the commerce power to
have any coherent meaning, we have seen, there must be
something that is not interstate commerce. As Pregerson
amply demonstrates, the activity at issue in this case qualifies.
Second, Breyer suggested that the proper way for activists to
secure a change in federal cannabis law on medicinal grounds
is to request federal regulators at the FDA take it off the list of
schedule I drugs. See OralArg., at 50. This is consistent with
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, yet
Barnett directed the Court's attention to those amicus curiae
briefs documenting the federal government's obstruction of
scientific research as well as those studies commissioned by
the national government which have shown the medical
benefits of cannabis. See id. at 51. One hopes that Breyer's
reflection on such obstruction may finally yield a crack in his
"beltway mentality," i.e., the assumption that all wisdom
resides in Washington D.C., regardless of what the States or
other western liberal democracies are doing. It can also only
be hoped that Breyer will acknowledge the fundamental
distinction between Raich and Morrison, the latter in which he
dissented partly based on his description of § 13981 as "an
instance not of state/federal conflict, but of state/federal efforts
to cooperate in order to help solve a mutually acknowledged
national problem." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 662.
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and Scalia 175 strongly suggest that they will rule for
Congress. A majority ruling to this effect would
seem at first glance a victory for the U.S.
government. Beyond securing Washington's power
to raid, prosecute, and imprison the likes of Angel
Raich and Diane Monson, for example, it could
slow the momentum of state cannabis law reform.
Unlike Breyer, Scalia wrote nothing in Lopez and
Morrison. Yet also unlike Breyer, he joined the majority in
both opinions. His remark to Clement that "it seems rather
ironic to appeal to the fact that home-grown marijuana would
reduce the interstate commerce that you don't want to occur in
order to regulate it," Oral Arg., at 7, was thus no surprise.
Nonetheless, Scalia pressed Barnett on two points.
He noted first that, relying on its commerce power,
Congress has legitimately criminalized the mere possession of
articles like ivory and eagle feathers. Id., at 26-27. However,
not only are such articles not medicine in the eyes of a
substantial portion of the American medical community, but
the criminalization of their possession is necessary for the
protection of endangered species. As Barnett thus noted,
"they're an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme that
would be undercut unless those activities are reached," id. at
27, and so are well within a workable exception to Lopez and
Morrison.
Expressing concern about the proper definition of the
class of activities at issue in Raich, secondly, Scalia noted that
he had heard "that there are communes that grow marijuana
for the medical use of all the members of the commune." Id. at
28. Presumably not impressed by the fact that the CUA
requires all members of such a commune to have valid
doctor's notes, this line of challenge may suggest that his
cultural conservatism, perhaps including support for the war
on marijuana, will compel him to vote to reverse the Ninth
Circuit. Indeed, though we can not know whether he was
serious, he expressly opined that Raich "looks like Wickard to
me." Id. at 40. As I have argued, however, making that case,
as well as distinguishing Lopez and Morrison, may prove so
difficult that any opinion Scalia writes will convince none but
the drug warrior faithful.
175
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Given the U.S. government's broader interests,
however, a ruling against these women could
backfire in several ways.
To begin, since it would only establish that the
U.S. government has power under federal law to go
after medical cannabis patients, such a ruling could
underscore Washington's considerable irrelevance
on this issue. Though states could not prevent the
federal raids and prosecutions, that is, they would
be required neither to assist in those raids nor to
enforce the CSA's rigid federal prohibition in their
courts, where the vast majority of cannabis
prosecutions take place under state law. Since
states with medical cannabis laws would be free to
continue enforcing those laws, then, public
authorities and medical cannabis patients in those
states would likely find a ruling in Congress' favor
simply irrelevant to how they operate on a daily
basis. Indeed, just as Roe v. Wade 176 energized its
opponents, such a ruling would likely have a similar
effect. Although many in Washington are still
gripped by the "reefer madness" hysteria of the
1930's, this issue is one of life and death for many
people, and organizations like NORML and the
Marijuana Policy Project would certainly ensure
that reformers in every state are aware of the limits
of such a ruling.
Beyond its reflection on the U.S. government
generally, a ruling against Raich and Monson could
leave the President, Congress, and the Court each
with egg on their faces.
As for the President, the Constitution requires
that the Chief Executive "shall take Care that the

176

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Laws be faithfully executed."' 177 If the Court clears
the way for Raich and Monson's prosecution, then,
Mr. Bush would seem duty bound to direct Mr.
Gonzales to ensure that these women are convicted
and imprisoned as the "drug felons" that U.S. law
and propaganda declare them to be. The DEA, after
all, found the courage to break down a sick
woman's door and destroy what state law and her
doctor deemed medicine. The least Mr. Bush could
do is order that these dangerous women be put on
trial. His ratings are at an all time low, 178 to be sure,
but he can certainly face down any fears that in a
country where 80% of adults support legalized
medicinal cannabis, a jury faced with imprisoning
these women might resort to jury nullification, with
the bad publicity that would generate.
If the Court rules for Congress, it might try to
soften the blow by chanting the D word - not
diversity, but democracy, something like "if change
is to come, it must come through the democratic
process, and so reformers should focus their efforts
on Congress." Though perhaps predictable, this
would be a mockery of sick patients like Angel
Raich and Diane Monson. Not only has the
democratic process in twelve states already spoken,
but there is no reason to expect courage from
Congress on the medical cannabis issue any time
soon. Indeed, like those of the President, Congress'
ratings are as low as they have been for some

177
178

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
"President Bush's approval ratings have continued to slide,

with a Gallup/USA Today/CNN poll this week recording the
highest negatives of his presidency." David Ignatius, A New
Beginning? WASH. POST, May 25, 2005, at A27.
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time, 179 and for good reason. It is, for example, the
one body that could have prevented our disastrous
military invasion of Iraq, e.g., by threatening the
President with impeachment and removal absent
clear proof of weapons of mass destruction and
links between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Having failed to
act with the stakes this high, most members of
Congress could hardly be expected to stand up to
cultural conservatives and in favor of a few people
who may not even live to vote against them in the
next election. The scientific consensus that smoked
cannabis provides relief for a range of ailments,
based largely on studies commissioned by the U.S.
government, will thus continue to be ignored.
As Ignatius observed, "a Pew Research Center Poll this
month found that only 35 percent of the public approved of the
Republican leadership in Congress." Id. See also Donald
Lambro, Public Mood Swings, WASH. TIMES, May 12, 2005,
at A20. (In recent polls, "Congress' scores dropped
significantly.")
180 As Congressman Pete Stark said on the House floor in
1999:
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
912, The Medical Use of Marijuana Act, introduced by
Representative Barney Frank. This bill would move
marijuana from Schedule I of the Controlled Substances
Act to Schedule II of the Act, allowing physicians to
prescribe marijuana to patients with a clear medical need
for the drug.
Institute of Medicine studies have shown that
components of marijuana relieve symptoms associated
with terrible diseases such as AIDS, cancer, glaucoma,
and epilepsy. The New England Journal of Medicine
also supports the medical use of marijuana in relieving
the symptoms linked with these illnesses. As an appetite
stimulant, marijuana can help prevent the weight loss
associated with cancer and AIDS. It can alleviate the
nausea and vomiting associated
with cancer
chemotherapy. Marijuana has also been proven to
179
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provide some relief to patients with glaucoma and
epilepsy. Additionally, marijuana can provide pain relief
to millions of patients suffering from conditions ranging
from post- surgery pain to chronic muscle spasms. Often
the alternative pain relief options for these conditions
have serious side effects such as liver and kidney
damage, stomach bleeding, and ulcers. Marijuana has
never been shown to cause death or serious illnesses
such as these.
Opposition to medical marijuana use has often
focused on the belief that legalizing the drug for medical
use will lead to an increase in its recreational use. I do
not condone recreational use of marijuana, nor does H.R.
912 seek to increase illicit use. This bill is simply meant
to treat marijuana as we treat drugs such as morphine. It
would only be available to those with a doctor's
prescription.
A recent Institute of Medicine report entitled
'Medicine and Health Flash' concluded that there is no
convincing data to support the belief that the medical use
of marijuana will lead to an increase in its illicit use. The
point of making marijuana a Schedule II drug is so that it
can be regulated as closely as other prescription drug
with the potential for abuse. As we have learned in the
failing 'War on Drugs', treating marijuana as an illicit
drug in all circumstances not only fails to curb its
recreational use, it eliminates a potential treatment for
some of the most painful and terrible diseases. Treating
marijuana as a prescription drug will give doctors more
alternatives for alleviating the pain and suffering of their
patients.
H.R. 912 would allow for the use and possession
of marijuana by those who have been prescribed the
drug by a physician. Passage of this bill will succeed in
opening the door to increased research into the ways
marijuana can be of a medicinal value. We must not
eliminate the drug as a potential tool for alleviating the
suffering of millions of Americans. I urge my colleagues
to support the Medical Use of Marijuana Act.
145 CONG. REc. 50 (1999).
Beyond this, cannabis' therapeutic potential has been
recognized for millenia throughout the world. In the U.S.,
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This, even though the U.S. government itself
acknowledged this scientific consensus in the late
1970's when it established the compassionate
investigative new drug (IND) program. Though it
stopped admitting patients in the early 1990's in
response to the AIDS epidemic, the U.S.
government to this day8 provides marijuana to a
handful of sick patients.'
American doctors began to explore cannabis-based medicine
in the 19 th century. The United States Pharmacopoeia, a
highly selective drug reference manual, began listing
Extractum Cannabis as a recognized medicine in 1850. In
1860, the Ohio State Medical Society held the first American
clinical conference on medical marijuana, concluding that it
was useful in the treatment of an array of ailments including
tetanus,
painful
menstruation,
convulsions,
asthma,
rheumatism, post-partum depression, gonorrhea, and chronic
bronchitis. It has been reported that over 100 articles were
published between 1840 and 1890 recommending cannabis for
one disorder or another. Accordingly, pharmaceutical
companies like Eli Lilly, Parke-Davis, and Squibb
manufactured preparations during this period with traces of
cannabis, made them available over the counter, and marketed
them largely as painkillers or sedatives.
See generally Michael Aldrich, History of Therapeutic
Cannabis, in CANNABIS IN MEDICAL PRACTICE (Mary Lynn
Mathre, ed., 1997); BLOOMQUIST, supra note 54; ALAN BOCK,
WAITING To INHALE: THE POLITICS OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
(2000); RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II,
THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA
PROHIBITION
IN THE UNITED STATES (1974);
NICK
BROWNLEE, THE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE To CANNABIS (2003);
ALBERT GOLDMAN, GRASSROOTS: MARIJUANA IN AMERICA

TODAY (1979);

LESTER GRINSPOON & SCOTT BAKALAR,

MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE (1993); MARK
DAVID MERLIN, MAN AND MARIJUANA: SOME ASPECTS OF
THEIR ANCIENT RELATIONSHIP (1972); LARRY SLOMAN, THE
HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN AMERICA: REEFER MADNESS
(1979); DAVID SOLOMON, THE MARIHUANA PAPERS (1966);
SOLOMON H. SNYDER, USES OF MARIJUANA (1971).

181See BOCK, supra note 10, at 154-55.
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Under these circumstances, the least Congress
should have done long ago is to have reclassified
cannabis as a schedule II substance under the CSA.
As we have seen, however, even this modest step
toward reason is not politically viable.' 82 Indeed,
last year the House rejected a bill simply directing
the DEA not to enforce the CSA contrary to state
laws allowing medical marijuana. 183 Most recently,
on May 4, 2005, the States' Rights to Medical
Marijuana Act (HR 2087) was reintroduced and
referred to the House Energy and Commerce
Committee,' 84 where it remains in limbo. If the
Court rules against Raich and Monson, then, it will
not only highlight Congress' failures in this area,
but increase pressure for reform from a body with
little political courage, even on behalf of the sick
and dying.
As for the Court itself, finally, a realist can
certainly say that the Court must simply choose in
this case between conflicting but powerful and
relevant principles - deferring to federal power vs.
limiting federal power. I conclude, however, with
three observations.
First, Raich and Monson challenged the CSA
not on its face, but only as applied to the specific
facts of their case. They do not seek to invalidate an
entire statute or even a single provision of federal
law, only to void its application to the facts of their
182

Neusch, supra note 10, at 211. Indeed, shortly after

Proposition 215 was enacted, Congress passed a "sense of the
Congress" resolution in opposition to medical marijuana. Act
of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-

760.

183 Viewpoint, ROLL CALL, July 13, 2004; For the Record,

WASH. POST, July 11, 2004, at T11.
184 151 CONG. REC. 2975 (2005).
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cases. In that sense, the ruling they seek is quite
limited in scope.
Second, if the activities in Lopez and Morrison
were beyond Congress' regulatory reach as noneconomic activities, the Court would be hard
pressed to make a convincing case that the activity
in Raich, which is at the core of states' police power
to legislate on behalf of public health and welfare,
IS economic activity within Congress' reach. If the
Court were to rule for Congress yet fail to make this
case, it would undermine the coherence of its
federalism jurisprudence for decades. Indeed, at that
point, it would be difficult to identify any human
activity Congress could not regulate. Even such a
champion of federal power as John Marshall would
never have gone that far.
Finally, beyond the Commerce Clause
dimension of this case, Monson and Raich also filed
suit under the Due Process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 85 The lower courts did not address
this theory, and the justices did not focus on it at
oral argument, yet there is a profound liberty
dimension to this case. This in turn implicates cases
like Roe v. Wade, which held that a woman has a
constitutional right, early in her pregnancy and in
consultation with her doctor, to abort a fetus. That
being the law, it would be hard to see how a sick
patient, in consultation with her doctor, would have
no right to consume cannabis in the privacy of her
home in order to relieve illness. Destruction of
innocent potential human life would be protected,
but protection of innocent actual human life would
not. Once again, it would take decades to sort out

185 See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227.
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such inconsistency in our constitutional law, and for
this the Court would have egg on its face as well.
Whichever way the Court rules, the U.S. can
resist the trend of other western liberal democracies
for only so long. Especially if the states, like
Canada and Europe, maintain their momentum
toward more rational cannabis policy, Congress will
eventually have to follow.
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